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“Computer Says No!”: The Impact of
Automation on the Discretionary
Power of Public Officers
Doaa Abu Elyounes*
ABSTRACT
The goal of this Article is to unpack the “human in the loop”
requirement in the process of automation. It will analyze the impact of
automation on street-level bureaucrats and lay out the steps policy
makers need to take into account to ensure that meaningful human
discretion is maintained. This issue is examined by comparing two
algorithms related to the use of automation to detect and investigate
fraud in welfare benefits. The first algorithm is used by Michigan’s
Unemployment Insurance Agency for detecting and investigating
unemployment fraud. This is a draconian algorithm with the ability to
automatically decide to cut an individual’s benefits and collect debts.
The second algorithm is used in the Netherlands by the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment to detect different types of welfare fraud.
It aids human fraud examiners and it automates only the process of data
collection and analysis.
This Article concludes that both algorithms could do more to
maintain meaningful discretion. In Michigan, automation has left little
room for street-level bureaucrats to apply discretion. Thus, this Article
suggests that the algorithm be limited to a few segments of the
unemployment fraud detection and investigation process. In contrast,
the Netherlands’ algorithm allows street-level bureaucrats greater
discretion. This discretion is also more meaningful because the human
in the loop has a well-defined decision-making role. However, since the
*
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algorithm is the de facto authority on who will be investigated, more
steps should be taken to ensure that key decisions are overseen by
humans. It is important to note that the lack of human agency was only
one reason for the failures of the algorithms. Poor technical design and
the sociopolitical context that the algorithms operated in were also
responsible. The failures stemming from all three reasons are further
explored in this Article.
Although these cases demonstrate the importance of keeping a
human in the loop in an automated process, questions such as what the
role of the human should be and how to design the human-algorithm
interaction have not received sufficient attention in academic literature.
This Article sheds light on these issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Those who followed the comedy show “Little Britain” in the early
2000s probably remember the apathy in David Walliams’s voice and
expression when, as a banker or hospital receptionist, he blindly relied
on a computer output and communicated the outcome to his clients.1 In
today’s world of increased automation we might consider ourselves
lucky if we got a chance to talk face to face with a public officer, even if
their answer would be, “Computer says no.”
1.
David Pereira, Computer Says No, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/computer-says-no-52a9c31cb8f2 [https://perma.cc/LVS9-62MY].
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Automation is creating a complex relationship between the
service seekers and the service providers by using computer systems as
an intermediary entity instead of human decision makers. This change
can lead to significant frustration among public servants, whose hands
feel tied because of the technology, and among citizens, who feel blocked
by unsatisfactory responses and heartless machines.2 Although the
biggest appeal of artificial intelligence (AI) was once the opportunity to
create algorithms that could mimic the human brain and replace
human decision-making, now there is a growing understanding that the
most beneficial and effective algorithms are the ones that are designed
to help humans and not replace them.3 In fact, among academics and
practitioners alike, as well as in the internationally recognized
documents for the use and development of AI, the need for human
control of technology is well emphasized.4
Street-level bureaucrats are public officers who work directly
with individuals, such as police officers, teachers, and social workers in
public agencies.5 The goal of this Article is to analyze the impact of
automation on street-level bureaucrats, to understand the role and the
degree of freedom that should be given to the human in the loop (i.e.,
the public officers who work with the algorithms), and to lay out the
steps that policy makers need to take into account to ensure that
meaningful human discretion is maintained. Street-level bureaucrats
who worked face to face with individuals before automation play an
important role in delivering public services by increasing accessibility
and bridging the gap between the higher administration and the
citizens.6 This Article examines this issue through two case studies
where the detection and investigation of fraud in welfare benefits was
2.
See Thomas Claburn, Fraud Detection System with 93% Failure Rate Gets IT
Companies Sued, REGISTER (Mar. 8, 2017, 6:29 AM), https://www.theregister.com/2017/03/
08/fraud_detection_system_with_93_failure_rate_gets_it_companies_sued/
[https://perma.cc/
SX2C-VKC3]; see also Hendrik Wagenaar, Discretion and Street-Level Practice, in DISCRETION AND
THE QUEST FOR CONTROLLED FREEDOM 259, 270 (Tony Evans & Peter Hupe eds., 2020).
3.
Clare McDonald, Why AI Should Assist Humans, Not Replace Them, COMPUT. WKLY.
(Sept. 7, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252448295/Why-AI-shouldassist-humans-not-replace-them [https://perma.cc/4EG3-5NHN].
4.
JESSICA FJELD, NELE ACHTEN, HANNAH HILLIGOSS, ADAM CHRISTOPHER
NAGY & MADHULIKA SRIKUMAR, PRINCIPLED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: MAPPING CONSENSUS IN
ETHICAL AND RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO PRINCIPLES FOR AI 8 (2020), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/42160420/HLS%20White%20Paper%20Final_v3.pdf?sequence=1&is
Allowed=y [https://perma.cc/T7RY-C2E5].
5.
Peter Hupe, Michael Hill & Aurélien Buffat, Introduction: Defining and
Understanding Street-Level Bureaucracy, in UNDERSTANDING STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 3, 15
(Peter Hupe, Michael Hill & Aurélien Buffat eds., 2015).
6.
Evelyn Z. Brodkin, The Inside Story: Street-Level Research in the U.S. and Beyond, in
UNDERSTANDING STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY, supra note 5, at 25, 28–29.
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wholly or partially automated. Although government officials and
citizens both want welfare benefits to be allocated to those who really
need them while catching and punishing those who are deceiving the
government, the draconian way in which welfare-fraud detection
algorithms operate is preventing vulnerable people from enjoying their
basic rights and receiving access to vital aid. These algorithms have
caused several false positives and unjustly cut benefits from people who
need them.7 Unable to plead with a computer that cutting the benefits
was a mistake, denied applicants are forced to confront walls of
bureaucracy without help from intermediate public officials.8
The two case studies discussed in this Article deal with two
different systems that attempted to automate the same task.9 The
first case study involves an algorithm deployed by the Michigan
Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA). The UIA purchased an
algorithm for detecting and investigating fraud in unemployment
benefits, the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System (MiDAS),
from a private vendor.10 MiDAS sifts through a large amount of data,
looking for any discrepancies between data submitted by the claimant,
information gathered from the employer, and other databases.11 MiDAS
is a decision-making algorithm because it has the authority to issue
final decisions that have a significant financial impact on individuals.
If any discrepancy is found, MiDAS attempts to communicate with the
individual to investigate further.12 If the response of the individual is
deemed insufficient by MiDAS, it automatically flags the case as
fraudulent.13 MiDAS can then automatically cut benefits, garnish
wages, and seize tax refunds.14
The second case study takes place in the Netherlands, where the
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment implemented the

7.
8.

See, e.g., Claburn, supra note 2.
Jen Fifield, What Happens When States Go Hunting for Welfare Fraud, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (May 24, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2017/05/24/what-happens-when-states-go-hunting-for-welfare-fraud [https://perma.cc/
DE34-MSR8].
9.
Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20 INFO.,
COMMC’N & SOC’Y 118, 120–21 (2017).
10.
RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M. SOUTHERLAND, LITIGATING
ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC
DECISION SYSTEMS 20 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.html
[https://perma.cc/XX3M-L94X].
11.
Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at ¶¶ 24–28, Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., No.
2:17-CV-10657-DML-RSW (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Cahoo Complaint].
12.
Id. ¶¶ 31, 41.
13.
Id. ¶ 28.
14.
Id. ¶ 102.
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System Risk Indication (SyRI) in order to help prevent all types of
welfare fraud.15 Unlike MiDAS, SyRI only automated the data
collection and analysis phase in order to assist fraud examiners in
making final decisions, but it does not make or execute any decision on
its own.16 SyRI collects and analyzes up to seventeen different data
types, including data about employment, education, accommodation,
and eligibility for benefits.17 If there is a discrepancy, a risk report is
created and passed on to the relevant agency for further investigation
and enforcement.18
The deployment of both algorithms failed spectacularly. There
was significant public backlash against the algorithms which led to
lawsuits against the agencies deploying them.19 Both algorithms had
a very high rate of false positives, which led to numerous false
accusations of fraud20 that were neither detected nor solved
promptly.21 The disastrous rollout of these algorithms exemplifies an
alarming trend of using technology for undermining human rights,
over-surveilling, and punishing the poor.22 In other words, lack of
sufficient and meaningful human agency was not the only reason for
the failure of the algorithms. Two additional causes—poor technical
design and the sociopolitical context in which the algorithms
operate—are later addressed and analyzed. Although incorporating
meaningful human discretion is a very important step, that alone will
not fix all failures of the examined algorithms.
The discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats and fair and
transparent administrative procedures are the two primary tools that
the law provides for balancing between legislating universal rules
and adjudicating individual cases. Automation has the potential to
jeopardize those mechanisms because automation reduces the room of
discretion by nature. In addition, the secrecy and opaqueness of
data-processing algorithms make their decisions difficult to review for
15.
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 24.
16.
Koen Vervloesem, How Dutch Activists Got an Invasive Fraud Detection Algorithm
Banned, ALGORITHM WATCH (Apr. 6, 2020), https://algorithmwatch.org/en/story/syri-netherlandsalgorithm/ [https://perma.cc/7HHM-3LUE].
17.
Profiling
and
SyRI,
PUB. INT. LITIG. PROJECT (Nov.
12,
2015),
https://pilpnjcm.nl/en/dossiers/profiling-and-syri/ [https://perma.cc/386E-KLGW].
18.
See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 24.
19.
See id.
20.
See Claburn, supra note 2; see also Amos Toh, Welfare Surveillance on Trial in the
Netherlands, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 8, 2019, 10:28 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/08/
welfare-surveillance-trial-netherlands [https://perma.cc/EWT9-4N9B].
21.
See Toh, supra note 20.
22.
Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/74/493 (Oct. 11, 2019).
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errors.23 Therefore, this Article analyzes how discretion can be
maintained despite automation and contribute to the design of fair and
transparent administrative procedures. First, Part II discusses the
evolution of street-level bureaucracy, discretionary power, and the
impact of different technological changes on street-level bureaucrats.
Part III introduces the two cases and lays the groundwork for the
rest of the discussion about street-level bureaucracy, discretion, and
automation. Part IV discusses the sociopolitical context in which the
algorithms are operating. Issues related to discretion are broken into
two parts: Part V discusses whether there is still room for street-level
bureaucrats to apply their discretion after automation by exploring
which domains and tasks were automated in each algorithm, and what
degree of discretion was transferred to the engineers and the technology
itself. Part VI discusses whether the discretion left for street-level
bureaucrats is meaningful by examining internal factors related to the
human-algorithm interaction and external factors related to the
interaction between the level of discretion, or lack thereof, and other
safeguards, such as due process, accountability, and transparency.
This Article concludes that both algorithms failed in considering
the impact of the automation on vulnerable groups. Michigan, which
pays the fewest number of weeks of unemployment benefits in the
nation and imposes a 400 percent penalty with interest for wrongly
obtaining money, deployed MiDAS with an intent to minimize welfare
payouts.24 Meanwhile, SyRI was deployed only in poor municipalities
without any indication that residents of these neighborhoods were
involved in higher rates of welfare fraud.25 In addition, the allocation
and termination of welfare benefits is a sensitive domain that requires
human oversight, which makes it unsuitable for full automation and
decision-making algorithms. If technology is to be used, decision-aiding
algorithms that are restricted and guided by street-level bureaucrats
who are familiar with the domain and the population are the proper
solution.
Both algorithms can do more to maintain meaningful discretion.
For MiDAS, street-level bureaucrats have little to no discretion because
the algorithm is the decision maker. Thus MiDAS should be restricted
to collecting and analyzing data. Although the fact that MiDAS is
limited to unemployment fraud is a plus, as the domain itself is quite
23.
See Paul B. de Laat, Algorithmic Decision-Making Based on Machine Learning from
Big Data: Can Transparency Restore Accountability?, 31 PHIL. & TECHN. 525, 526 (2018).
24.
MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AGENCY’S UNJUST FRAUD CLAIMS 1,
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/Factsheet%20-%20MiDAS.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH7U-2GX8] [hereinafter MIDAS FACTSHEET].
25.
Toh, supra note 20.
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narrow, more authority should be given to street-level bureaucrats to
apply their discretion and expertise, and that authority needs to be
clearly defined. Conversely, in SyRI street-level bureaucrats have more
room to intervene. The discretion is also more well defined than in
MiDAS, as it is clearer what the role of the human in the loop is—to
look for false positives and to further investigate cases flagged by SyRI.
However, since SyRI is de facto deciding who will be investigated and
who will not, more steps should be taken to ensure that humans are
involved in key decisions. For example, if SyRI flags a case as
suspicious, the case could be put under surveillance for up to two years.
Because SyRI operates so opaquely, it is unknown when there is any
human involvement before deciding to place each case under
surveillance and for how long. In addition to being a safeguard for
automation, human discretion also plays an important role in
complying with other safeguards. Both MiDAS and SyRI can do more
to facilitate the interaction between the human in the loop and other
important safeguards.
Discretion is a safeguard for maintaining unmediated
communication between the individual applicant and the public agent
making the final determination. The human factor is the element that
connects the dots and makes sense of the process; it is what makes the
final decision more humane. As Part II illustrates, in recent years, there
have been significant changes in the way public officers were perceived
and their expertise is valued much more under the new public
management approach. The argument that this Article puts forward is
that, if not governed properly, the rise of automated tools that are
taking discretion away from street-level bureaucrats could move public
administrations backward toward the traditional approach and
degrade the quality of service that citizens are receiving.
Thus, the following diagram summarizes the steps that have to
be taken in order to ensure sufficient and meaningful discretion, steps
that will be discussed in more detail throughout this Article.
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How to maintain sufficient and meaningful room for
discretionary street-level bureaucracy?

Sufficient

Task and Domain
Automation

 How broad is the
automated domain?
Large-scale
bureaucracy or
system-level
bureaucracy?
 What part of the
process was
automated?
Decision-making
versus decision-aiding
algorithm?
 What is the
automated task?
A rule or a standard?

Discretionary Power
of Engineers

 Planning
What is the machine
learning technique
that will be used and
why?
 Data engineering
What is the data set
composed of?
 Modeling
What is the
operational logical
sequence of the
algorithm?
 Testing and
maintenance
How often is the
algorithm
revalidated?

Meaningful

Internal
Aspects

External
Aspects

 How determinative
is the algorithmic
outcome?
Yes, no, or a scale of
eligibility levels?
 How many cases
street-level
bureaucrats must
deal with?
Before and after the
automation?
 How ready are the
institutions for
automation?
Planning, training,
supervision, and
rearranging roles within
the organization?
 How involved are
the street-level
bureaucrats in the
automation process?
Fully, partially, not at
all?

 Due process
Lack of human
discretion harms
individuals’ right to
receive a proper notice
about the allegations,
to be heard, and to
appeal the decision.
 Purpose limitation
Human agency would
ensure that the “big
guns” of surveillance
are used only when
really needed.
 Data minimization
Human involvement
would ensure that
biased and
discriminatory patterns
are excluded from the
processing.
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISCRETIONARY STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY
AND ITS IMPACT ON WELFARE SERVICES
The purpose of this Part is to provide a theoretical background
for the discussion of the impact of automation on street-level
bureaucrats and their discretion. This Part begins with a brief overview
of the role of street-level bureaucrats in delivering public services and
the importance of discretion in general. Then, it focuses on the
characteristics of the discretion of welfare officers in particular. In
addition, this Part discusses the impact of technology on street-level
bureaucracy in general and on welfare in particular.
A. Street-Level Bureaucracy and Discretion
In his seminal 1980 work, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas
of the Individual in Public Services, Michael Lipsky coined the
term “street-level bureaucracy.”26 Street-level bureaucrats are public
officers who work directly with individuals, such as police officers,
teachers, and social workers in public agencies.27 One of the important
characteristics that allows street-level bureaucrats to perform their jobs
is discretion: the authority to interpret the policies that they are tasked
with implementing and apply them to individual cases. Although
street-level bureaucrats range in experience from specialized expertise
that requires higher degrees to very brief training, their discretionary
power places them in a unique position as “policy co-makers.”28
Administrative discretion is an inherent part of the work of any public
officer. Detailing the policies for executing any law after it is enacted,
designing the relevant mechanisms within the responsible agency,
prioritizing assignments, and delivering the services are all tasks that
involve a high degree of discretion.29 Decisions such as whether to
give someone a ticket for a traffic violation, to assign a student to a
particular school or class, or to grant someone a loan are likewise all
within the discretionary prerogative of street-level bureaucrats.30
26.
See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 3 (1980) (“Public service workers who interact directly with
citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their
work are called street-level bureaucrats in this study. Public service agencies that employ a
significant number of street-level bureaucrats in proportion to their work force are called
street-level bureaucracies.”).
27.
See Hupe, Hill & Buffat, supra note 5.
28.
See id. at 16.
29.
Justin B. Bullock, Artificial Intelligence, Discretion and Bureaucracy, 49 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 751, 752–53 (2019).
30.
See LIPSKY, supra note 26, at 3–4.
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Under the traditional public management approach, hierarchy
was strictly maintained.31 Discretion was not allowed except with
permission from higher officials; low-level administrators were
expected to strictly follow the rules of their instructors.32 The power of
street-level bureaucrats had to be strictly controlled, so several
hierarchical rules were imposed and lengthy guidelines detailing their
exact duties were formulated in order to keep the power with the
high-level officers.33 However, this approach was unsatisfactory. It
created a bottleneck because street-level bureaucrats had limited power
and could not meet the citizens’ needs, as their hands were tied, and
could not use creativity or think outside the box in order to help citizens
in need to access social benefits.
Under the new public management approach, high-level officials
recognized that low-level officials “on the ground” could aggregate
substantial knowledge that made them better adjudicators.34 Hence,
more power was given to the street-level bureaucrats who serve as the
intermediary between the citizens and the higher public management.35
Under this new approach, the concept of street-level bureaucracy was
expanded and street-level bureaucrats were no longer exclusively found
inside the government. Reforms led to contracting with nonprofit and
for-profit organizations with the purpose of stimulating competition
and better meeting the needs of citizens.36 It should be noted that the
shift from the traditional public management approach to the new
public management approach is an international phenomenon.37
The traditional public management approach asserted by Max
Weber has been recognized as suitable to the Industrial Revolution era
where the role of policy making was attributed to politicians and the
role of civil servants rested in their ability to execute the orders of
politicians.38 This model contributed to the rise of large organizations.
In the early 1990s, however, due to economic, social, historical, and
31.
James P. Pfiffner, Traditional Public Administration Versus the New Public
Management: Accountability Versus Efficiency, in INSTITUTIONENBILDUNG IN REGIERUNG UND
VERWALTUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS KONIG 443, 443–44 (A. Benz, H. Siedentopf & K.P.
Sommermann eds., 2004).
32.
Id. at 447–48.
33.
See Steven Rathgeb Smith, Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public Policy, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 431, 435 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2d ed. 2012).
34.
Cf. Tony Evans & Peter Hupe, Conceptualizing Discretion, in DISCRETION AND THE
QUEST FOR CONTROLLED FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 1, 5.
35.
See Smith, supra note 33, at 436.
36.
Id. at 439–43.
37.
See Yousif El-Ghalayini, New Public Management: An Assessment of Impact and the
Influence on Public Administration, 6 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. RSCH. 18, 19–20 (2016).
38.
See Pfiffner, supra note 31, at 444.
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political factors, the need to reform public administration and improve
public services emerged.39 When organizations became too big and
complex, the centralization created a massive delay in execution and
did not allow civil servants to respond quickly to changes.40 With more
responsibilities for street-level bureaucrats, more mechanisms for
holding them accountable were developed. Those mechanisms included
stricter assessment of performance and empowering citizens to actively
demand greater transparency.41 However, questions about how much
discretionary power should be delegated to street-level bureaucrats and
how they should be using it are the subject of a continuing and heated
debate.
The most common justification for discretion stems from the
nature of laws and policies, which are often written in a very general
manner and in broad terms in order to cover a wide range of cases.
Thus, discretion is applied in each individual case to close gaps within
the law and ensure equitable results.42 This is especially important in
sensitive domains such as welfare and health care, where legislators
may provide additional guidance but otherwise leave street-level
bureaucrats to solve complex situations.43 And even if a law is specific
and clear, it is not possible to anticipate all the potential implications
of a specific law or policy, so discretion is needed for solving cases on
which the law is silent. In these cases, the street-level bureaucrats use
their reasoning abilities, acquired experience, and common sense.44
However, discretion requires decision makers to diverge from
the letter of the law on the books and create new and practical rules
that fit individual cases. With this broad leeway, there is an increased
risk that this power will be applied arbitrarily. Different officers might
apply their discretionary power differently, and individual officers
might handle similar cases inconsistently. This could lead to
discrimination, interfere with individuals’ right to receive equal
treatment, and prevent them from developing reliable expectations
about what benefits they are eligible for.45 Additionally, delegating
discretionary power to street-level bureaucrats could interfere with
democratic governance. Unelected street-level bureaucrats might not
apply policies as originally intended by the elected legislature. In
39.
See El-Ghalayini, supra note 37, at 20.
40.
See Pfiffner, supra note 31, at 444–45.
41.
See Smith, supra note 33, at 439–40.
42.
See Anders Molander, Harald Grimen & Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Professional Discretion
and Accountability in the Welfare State, 29 J. APPLIED PHIL. 214, 214 (2012).
43.
See id. at 223–25.
44.
See id.
45.
Id. at 217–18.
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addition, discretion could undermine accountability; it is hard to hold
street-level bureaucrats accountable for their actions because many fall
within their prerogative power.46 The impact of new technology on
this debate over administrative discretion and the extent of public
administrators’ discretionary power, especially in the welfare context,
are examined below.
B. From Street-Level Bureaucracy to System-Level Bureaucracy
The rapid deployment of advanced technology in the public
sector starting in the 1990s and continuing now is significantly shaping
administrative discretion and the degree of its influence. Governments
are rapidly deploying advanced analytics and artificial intelligence
algorithms in order to achieve two goals: (1) to improve the quality
of services for their citizens, and (2) to deal with budget cuts
and increasing workloads.47 The deployment of information and
communication technologies reduced the direct contact of public officers
with individuals, put a screen between the two, and shifted the focus of
the officers from handling individual cases to more administrative
tasks. Street-level bureaucracy was replaced with “screen-level
bureaucracy” and later on by “systems-level bureaucracy.”48 In the
screen-level bureaucracy era, caseworkers mainly fed data into
standard electronic forms while the actual decision-making was done
by the software.49 Screen-level bureaucracies were not very successful
due to a lack of unanimity among systems and the fact that different
components inside one system required focusing on the interrelations
between processes.50 For example, consider the case of applying for a
student grant: in the street-level bureaucracy era, an interview with an
officer from the Ministry of Education determined whether the student
would get the grant and what would be the amount. In the screen-level
bureaucracy era, officers were tasked with detailing the criteria on
which they based their decisions and they mainly feed data that
students manually wrote into the computer. However, not all computer
systems across all offices of the Ministry were consistent, and this led

46.
Wagenaar, supra note 2, at 260–61.
47.
See Michael Veale & Irina Brass, Administration by Algorithm? Public Management
Meets Public Sector Machine Learning, in ALGORITHMIC REGULATION 121, 121 (Karen
Yeung & Martin Lodge eds., 2019); Alston, supra note 22.
48.
Mark Bovens & Stavros Zouridis, From Street-Level to System-Level Bureaucracies:
How Information and Communication Technology Is Transforming Administrative Discretion and
Constitutional Control, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 174, 175, 177 (2002).
49.
See id. at 177.
50.
Pereira, supra note 1.
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to certain fixes being implemented in one office but not another or to
bugs related to the fact that the same people appeared in a different
system with a different status.51 Later on, system-level bureaucracy
arose. System-level bureaucrats mainly develop strategies for designing
IT systems tasked with automation and creating links between existing
IT systems in the organizations in order to smooth the automation
process.52 In this era, officials interact with their citizens even less since
more people have internet access and can thus fill out forms on their
own.
This progression from street-level to system-level bureaucracy
can be seen in the enforcement of traffic violations. Traditionally, police
officers were responsible for enforcing speed limits and had the
discretion of deciding which car to stop and whether to ticket the driver
or just issue a warning.53 In the screen-level bureaucracy era, the police
kept on doing their jobs but since all the agencies involved (police,
prosecutors, courts, etc.) computerized their records, the police officer
had access to a wide range of information and could make a more
informed decision.54 Finally, by installing street cameras and
delegating the task to a system-level bureaucrat, the discretionary
power was eliminated.55 After the camera catches a violation and the
system verifies the person to whom the car is registered, a ticket is
issued automatically.56
On the one hand, eliminating the administrative discretion led
to a positive outcome: more neutral and uniform law enforcement.
Anyone who violated the traffic laws could expect to be punished, and
the risk that the police would stop mainly people of a certain class based
on their appearance or the car they drove was eliminated. On the other
hand, the criminal law system, which in the past required an individual
assessment by an experienced judge, is now being replaced by a
standardized judgment under administrative law. Although it is
efficient to reserve the precious time of judges for cases more severe
than traffic violations, the way the change has been implemented has
hindered easy resolution of marginal cases, such as where the ticketed
person wishes to convince the authorities that the traffic sign was
missing.57

51.
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See Bovens & Zouridis, supra note 48, at 178.
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Id. at 179.
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In modern system-level bureaucracies, public servants indeed
have less discretionary power than they did before, and they are guided
by more detailed and strict regulations on how to interpret standards.58
In addition, physical interaction with citizens is significantly reduced,
as public officers now work mainly behind the scenes on designing and
operating the systems.59 In other words, the “technostructure” is now
the operating core of each organization; the system is most powerful
and the humans who remain in the process support the structure
dictated by the automatic system. However, discretion has not been
completely eliminated; it has merely shifted to new actors—the IT
engineers who build and design the system.60 These data engineers are
becoming the new street-level bureaucrats, but they are not focusing on
individual cases. They approach the process with different skills,
exporting data into mathematical formulas capable of identifying
patterns and making predictions.61 The only cases processed by humans
under the new regime are the “hard cases” that the machine is not able
to deal with, although the machine still plays a role in flagging those
cases.62
There are several problems with this structure. First, engineers
and data analysts are not public officers by training nor by definition
(i.e., they do not interact with individuals and understand their
needs, rather they are driven mainly by increasing efficiency), so the
considerations that they take into account could lack governmental
and democratic checks and balances. Second, since system-level
bureaucracies are highly centralized and linked, other administrative
agencies could be impacted as any error could create a chain reaction
that would be hard to untangle.63 Third, the use of algorithms and
automated systems increases the number of blind spots in the process,
and although this creates more opportunities to apply discretion, these
blind spots are often hidden so it is difficult to control the use of
discretion and prevent its abuse.64
Research
on
discretion
is
highly
contextual
and
interdisciplinary, so it often requires bridging the gap between different
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Id. at 176.
See Stavros Zouridis, Marlies van Eck & Mark Bovens, Automated Discretion, in
DISCRETION AND THE QUEST FOR CONTROLLED FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 313, 315–17.
60.
See id. at 318–19.
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See id. at 318–20.
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Id. at 322.
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conceptions of freedom and power.65 Thus, the discussion about the
proper governance mechanisms and the impact of automation has to be
tailored to the domain at stake. The next Section discusses the evolution
of street-level bureaucracy and administrative discretion in the context
of welfare.
C. Street-Level Discretion and the Welfare State
Street-level agencies play a major role in the welfare system,
where they serve as the mediators between individuals and the state
and bridges between the official policy in the books and the policy in
practice.66 Street-level bureaucrats have a dual role: they are formal
gatekeepers because they grant benefits and services according to the
rules, and they are also informal gatekeepers because they can use their
discretion to rule for or against certain individuals according to their
own interpretation of the aforementioned rules.67 And because informal
gatekeeping is so difficult to trace, it is hard to hold bureaucrats
accountable for it.
Two major trends have contributed to shaping the current form
of welfare services. First, as mentioned in the previous Section, is the
shift from the traditional to the new model of public management.
Under the traditional model, the idea was to create large-scale
bureaucracies that would help citizens exercise their rights in the
modern industrialized world.68 Welfare benefits were considered part
of the social rights that the government ought to distribute, and
welfare agencies were governmental agencies operating like large-scale
bureaucracies and employing many street-level bureaucrats.69
Although this was the general trend, there were differences between
jurisdictions. While the European welfare states had more noticeable
large-scale bureaucracies, the United States did not allocate the
necessary resources for developing and maintaining such agencies.70
The large-scale bureaucracies operated in a top-down manner, where
the direction and tone were dictated by upper-level managers.71 Under
this model, street-level bureaucrats were overloaded and were unable

65.
66.

See Evans & Hupe, supra note 34, at 7–8.
Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Discretion in the Welfare State, in DISCRETION AND THE QUEST FOR
CONTROLLED FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 63, 63.
67.
Id. at 68–69.
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to meet the citizens’ demands, so they had to ration services by slowing
down processes—creating long queues and limiting access as a result.72
Under the new public management model, welfare allocation
became much more decentralized. In 1996 in the United States,
Congress transferred much of the responsibility for welfare
administration from the federal system to the states; thus, welfare
services were subject to the financial capabilities of each state and the
political willingness to support welfare initiatives.73 In Europe, the idea
behind decentralization was to give street-level bureaucrats more
responsibilities and to increase their level of engagement so that they
would support broader policies instead of sabotaging them.74
The second trend was the move from universalistic to selective
social policies. While under a universalistic approach welfare benefits
are made available to everyone as a social right, a selective approach
distributes benefits only to those who need them the most and
determines eligibility with financial tests.75 Supporters of the selective
approach claim that if benefits are given on the basis of need, this will
lead to better allocation of scarce public resources and enable the
government to give more to the poor.76 However, believers in the
universalistic approach adhere to the idea that equal distribution of
benefits promotes solidarity and prevents labeling the poor as a burden
on society.77 In addition, if benefits depend on income, this could
encourage certain people not to work and instead rely on the benefits.78
Traditionally, European countries, and in particular Scandinavian
countries, have followed the universal model for the vast majority of
benefits, while Anglo-American countries have adopted the selective
model.79 In recent years, there has been a worldwide convergence
toward the selective approach and means testing as a condition for
receiving benefits.80 As part of this trend, street-level bureaucrats were
instructed to “activate” clients by conducting training programs for job
hunting, helping with job applications, and understanding the program
72.
See id. at 434, 439–41.
73.
Marcia K. Meyers, Norma M. Riccucci & Irene Lurie, Achieving Goal Congruence in
Complex Environments: The Case of Welfare Reform, 11 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 165,
165–66 (2001).
74.
Deborah Rice, Street-Level Bureaucrats and the Welfare State: Toward a
Micro-Institutionalist Theory of Policy Implementation, 45 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 1038, 1038–39 (2012).
75.
NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFORMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT SURRENDER OF
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 136 (2002).
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or skills needed.81 The selective approach, combined with activation
policies, increased the use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats since
the eligibility for benefits, and sometimes the total payout, was
conditioned on complying with either protocols developed by the
street-level bureaucrats or their general impression of the individual’s
compliance.82 Distributing benefits on a selective basis can thus be a
veiled but effective way to reduce the scope of coverage. While on its
face the goal of the program remains the same—supporting those who
are most vulnerable—creating subcategories of impairment increases
the threshold for eligibility.83 It becomes harder to apply, and the people
who are eligible could be unaware of their eligibility.
D. The Impact of Technology on Street-Level Bureaucrats in the
Context of Welfare
The advanced technology used, including online platforms for
applying for benefits, coupled with big data and surveillance
mechanisms, is catalyzing the shift to the selective approach and
enabling means testing. The trends that were discussed above
regarding the influence of technology on administrative discretion are
specifically relevant to the automation of welfare officers’ discretion.
Surveillance technology significantly influences the degree of discretion
street-level bureaucrats have in their decision-making. On the one
hand, the vast amount of data generated by surveillance technology
could increase the robustness of decision-making and enhance security
since welfare officers have stronger grounds to base their decisions on.84
In addition, automation could allow system-level bureaucrats to focus
on the broader picture beyond individualized interactions, to identify
patterns of discretion, and to engage with welfare issues that require a
change.85 On the other hand, the use of surveillance technologies has
many drawbacks. In liberal democracies, the use of surveillance
technologies is mainly associated with a threat to freedom and an
attempt by the government to enforce social order and manage its
population.86 Surveillance technology can also contribute to the
marginalization of certain communities by encouraging profiling and
attaching labels to people, a particularly relevant issue for the cases
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Rice, supra note 74, at 1039.
See Molander, Grimen & Eriksen, supra note 42, at 215–16.
GILBERT, supra note 75, at 149.
Mark Hardy, Discretion in the Surveillance State, in DISCRETION AND THE QUEST FOR
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that will be discussed in this Article.87 Finally, research shows that
when governmental agencies opted for automated processes, it became
harder to seek some welfare benefits because the assessment is not done
by experts but by a machine, which can assess a massive amount of
cases faster but pays less attention to individual circumstances.88
System-level bureaucracies have narrowed the discretionary
power of caseworkers, who now focus on building and shaping the
systems, but they still retain some power as to the type of information
that they feed the system. The fact that caseworkers are no longer able
to communicate face to face with their clients and listen to their
struggles has been a major source of frustration and criticism among
both caseworkers and clients.89 This element is particularly important
because caseworkers are not only helping their clients understand their
rights and apply for benefits but also serving as a bridge between what
is often the “chaotic lifestyle” of the clients and the “ordered world” of
bureaucracy, the latter of which requires the submission of extensive
documents, keeping up with some payments, and other onerous
requirements.90 In the era of system-level bureaucracy, the relationship
between the caseworker and the individual is no longer central because
faces and stories are turning into risk factors and variables in
equations.91 These conflicts between the roles of caseworkers as social
workers versus data analysts, and between efficiency, effectiveness,
and scientific robustness versus individual needs in welfare, are at the
core of the discussions in both the Michigan and the Netherlands case
studies.
III. AUTOMATION OF FRAUD DETECTION IN WELFARE BENEFITS IN
MICHIGAN AND IN THE NETHERLANDS
In this Part, two case studies about the automation of welfare
fraud investigations will be discussed. The first involves an algorithm
that automated the detection and investigation of fraud in
unemployment benefits in Michigan, and the second involves an
algorithm that automated the detection of welfare fraud in the
Netherlands. The goal of this Part is to lay the groundwork for a more
87.
Id. at 47.
88.
Brodkin, supra note 66, at 69.
89.
See, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, The Policy Machine: The Dangers of Letting Algorithms
Make Decisions in Law Enforcement, Welfare, and Child Protection, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2015, 1:55
PM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/04/the-dangers-of-letting-algorithms-enforce-policy.html
[https://perma.cc/ZB8M-RL43].
90.
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detailed discussion of the different aspects of discretion that were
automated and their impact on street-level bureaucracy.
A. The Michigan Case: Detecting Fraud in Unemployment Benefits
The Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) deployed
the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System (MiDAS) in October
2013.92 MiDAS superseded a thirty-year-old IBM program whose
operation cost $10 million.93 The old program consisted of several
systems and platforms, each responsible for a certain task.94 MiDAS
attempted to gather all of UIA’s operational systems under one roof.95
The goal of MiDAS was to provide real-time data sharing across
functions in the UIA, enhance productivity, improve customer services,
and ease compliance with changing regulations.96 MiDAS was
developed by FAST Enterprises, which configured its GenTax
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) application to the needs and
characteristics of the UIA.97 CSG Government Solutions, another
private vendor, was tasked with overseeing and managing the project.98
On the government side, the UIA and the Department of Technology,
Management, and Budget oversaw the production and implementation
of MiDAS.99 The design and implementation of MiDAS began in 2011
and took approximately two years, after which additional components
were gradually added.100 One of the major functions of MiDAS was to
reduce the costs associated with the detection and adjudication of
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alleged fraud in unemployment benefits.101 SAS, Inc. was brought in to
implement the fraud detection project, which started in 2013 and was
implemented in 2015.102 Its goals were reducing fraud in unemployment
benefits distribution, identifying violations by linking data from
different agencies, and recognizing patterns of fraudulent activity.103
Unfortunately, MiDAS proved to be a shockingly ineffective algorithm
that did not fulfill its promise. It generated mainly false positives, and
approximately 93 percent of cases were wrongly flagged.104 MiDAS
replaced approximately four hundred employees at the UIA who had
been reviewing individual cases and potential discrepancies; this also
reduced the number of public officers working with individuals from 260
to 184.105 Before MiDAS was implemented, the caseworkers conducted
interviews with individuals, dealt with any questions that were
unclear, and used their discretion to determine why the individual was
suspected of committing fraud, when fraud occurred, and how many
weeks of benefits should be returned (if any).106
MiDAS sifts through a large amount of data, looking for any
discrepancies in the records of individuals who are currently receiving
or have previously received UIA benefits.107 If any discrepancy is found,
for example, between documents submitted by the employer and the
information reported by the beneficiary, MiDAS automatically flagged
the case for potential “claimant misrepresentation.”108 A common
discrepancy is a mismatch between the reported reason for applying for
the benefits by the employer and the employee. If the employee selected
being fired and the employer selected termination of the employment,
MiDAS did not understand that those are synonyms, and it flagged the
case.109 Once the case has been flagged, MiDAS began the process of
determining if the discrepancy constitutes fraud. MiDAS automatically
issued a letter to the individual that questioned her eligibility, and it
asked her to answer two questions: (1) “Did you intentionally provide
false information to obtain benefits you were not entitled to receive?”
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Id. This Article focuses only on the fraud detection component aspect and not any
other UIA functions.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Claburn, supra note 2.
105.
MIDAS FACTSHEET, supra note 24.
106.
Telephone Interview with Tony Paris, Lead Att’y, Sugar L. Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Just.
(Feb. 7, 2020).
107.
Cahoo Complaint, supra note 11, ¶¶ 24–28.
108.
Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
109.
Telephone Interview with Jennifer Lord, Partner, Pitt, McGehee, Palmer,
Bonanni & Rivers (Jan. 1, 2020).

472

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:3:451

and (2) “Why did you believe you were entitled to benefits?”110 Eight
possible answers were listed, for example, “I needed the money,” “I did
not understand how to report my earnings or separation reason,” and
“Someone else certified (reported) for me.”111 The letter did not include
individual explanations of why the case was flagged, and it did not give
the individual an option to report that they were legitimately entitled
to the benefits and that the information was reported in good faith.112
This is one of the most troubling problems with MiDAS or any other
algorithmic system that lacks meaningful overview. There is no room
for the individual to explain the situation because even the most
advanced language processing techniques would struggle to understand
the meaning of any open statement that the individual provides.113 If
the individual did not respond within ten days, or if MiDAS deemed
the response unsatisfactory, it automatically determined the case as
fraud.114 In 2016, the Michigan Office of the Auditor General conducted
an audit of MiDAS and identified critical failures in its operation. The
number of appeals of fraud determinations had increased exponentially
from 2,280 to 22,473 after the deployment of MiDAS, and the state had
to employ new judges to handle the flood of appeals, 92 percent of which
were successful.115 In addition, the Auditor General criticized the lack
of security measures in MiDAS that could cause losses or compromises
of data.116
The draconian way in which MiDAS operated led to the seizure
of tax refunds, garnishment of wages, and imposition of high
penalties.117 Thousands of individuals were falsely accused of
committing fraud.118 At least a thousand of them had to file for
bankruptcy and many are still suffering from the negative ramifications
of a bad credit report that can limit their ability to conduct daily tasks
such as renting an apartment, seeking employment, or obtaining
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loans.119 Others pled guilty to fraudulent activity they did not commit,
hoping to end the misery as fast as possible without considering
consequences, such as being barred from certain professions like
teaching and financial advising because of the moral turpitude
associated with fraud.120 At least two individuals committed suicide
because of the financial penalties imposed by MiDAS.121 After the news
about MiDAS broke, legislation was passed that prohibited the UIA
from making fraud determinations solely by computer program and
mandated improved notice requirements.122 However, the UIA did not
reveal information about what the oversight included.123
Two class action lawsuits filed in 2015 attempted to challenge
different aspects of MiDAS. The first was a class action lawsuit brought
before the State of Michigan Court of Claims by Grant Bauserman and
two others on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, against
the Michigan UIA, alleging due process violations.124 The second case
was a federal class-action lawsuit brought before the US District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan by five individuals and other
similarly situated persons against the private companies that UIA
contracted with for developing MiDAS and six decision makers at UIA
in their individual capacity.125 Both cases are still in their early stages
due to several attempts to move for dismissal on administrative
grounds.
B. The Netherlands Case: Detecting Welfare and Tax Fraud
The algorithmic fraud detection system that operates in the
Netherlands (SyRI) is different from MiDAS. On the one hand, it has
fewer capabilities because it only automates data collection and
analysis—it does not automatically determine any violation—and there
is a considerable amount of human oversight included in the system.126
On the other hand, SyRI is a large-scale system that is exposed to
significantly much more data that comes from a broad range of
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governmental agencies.127 It also simultaneously investigates different
types of fraud in welfare benefits, and it has surveillance capabilities.128
SyRI is an algorithmic system implemented by the Netherlands’
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment with the goal of preventing
social security, employment, and tax fraud.129 SyRI is an optional
national project used only at the request of a municipality that wants
to work together with other administrations.130 Five projects have been
initiated throughout the lifetime of the algorithm but three of them
were canceled in the early stages due to capacity problems, product
delays, and because of doubts related to the privacy impact
assessment.131 Two projects were eventually conducted in notably poor
municipalities or poor neighborhoods in certain municipalities, which
is one of the main criticisms of the system’s deployment.132 The system
operates using a “neighborhood-centered approach risk model,” a model
that is based on multidisciplinary intervention that ensures compliance
with the law and fighting fraud while helping residents improve the
quality of their lives and notifying them about benefits for which they
might be eligible.133
SyRI compiled and analyzed data from several governmental
agencies, such as the municipality, the tax office, the employee
insurance provider, the social security bank responsible for child benefit
and pensions, the immigration authority, and the department
responsible for the prosecution of labor law violations.134 The algorithm
searched for discrepancies in the data and flagged the cases that posed
a high risk of illegitimate conduct or noncompliance with the laws,
which are put under surveillance for up to two years.135 At the end, if
the case was still suspicious, a risk report was created and sent to the
relevant agency for further investigation and debt collection if
necessary.136 One example of a discrepancy would be if someone was
receiving housing benefits without being registered at the address that
is given on the forms. After a discrepancy was detected, an employee
127.
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from the Ministry of Social Affairs was tasked with examining the case
and making sure that there were no false signals,137 for example, the
individual lived in a retirement home where many people shared the
same address. The data analyst would report such errors in order to
adjust the model and prevent it from happening again.138
On the technical front, the creation of the risk report was divided
into two steps: data processing and data analysis.139 In the processing
stage, the Benefits Intelligence Agency Foundation (Stichting
Inlichtingenbureau [hereinafter IB]), a special foundation created to
coordinate the SyRI project and the collaboration between the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment and the municipalities, encrypted all
identifying personal information, a risk classification was applied to the
encrypted data, and the files of those who are flagged by the algorithm
as high risk cases were decrypted.140 The foundation then passed the
report to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for further
investigation and was supposed to delete the data within four weeks.141
The task of the Ministry was to investigate the report for research
worthiness and discover issues like the retirement home, as in the
example above.142
The use of SyRI was authorized by Parliament in 2014 as part
of a broader welfare reform.143 Its legality is anchored in Articles 64–65
of the Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen
(SUWI).144 According to Article 64, the purpose of cooperation between
governmental agencies is to facilitate “integral government action with
regard to the prevention and combating of unlawful use of government
funds and government provisions in the field of social security and
income-related arrangements.”145 Article 64 also emphasizes that the
137.
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138.
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139.
See id.
140.
Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶ 4.28 (Neth.).
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Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶¶ 4.29, 4.30 (Neth.).
142.
See id. ¶ 4.30.
143.
Toh, supra note 20.
144.
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Stb. 2001, art. 65. “Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen” is the Act concerning
the Structure of the Implementation of the Labor and Income in the Netherlands. See Rechtbank
den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No. C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM
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See id. ¶ 4.4. Please note that the quotation is taken from an unofficial translation of
the judgment in Dutch and therefore there might be minimal inaccuracies in the translation. See
generally id.
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processing of the collected data should be in accordance with the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).146 Article 65 provides the
legal basis for processing the data and outlines the seventeen types of
data that can be processed, including work data, data about
administrative sanctions such as fines, tax data, trade data,
accommodation data, data about benefits including exclusion from
benefits, education data, and more.147 Article 65 also sets the conditions
for creating “risk reports” by SyRI: it must be “a finding of an increased
risk of unlawful use of government funds or government facilities in the
area of social security and income-related schemes”; aligned with the
purpose stated in Article 64; and processed by designated personnel
within the agency.148
According to the authorities, €496,000 were saved as a result of
discontinuation or recovery of state benefits and allowances due to
SyRI.149 However, similar to MiDAS, SyRI had many technical flaws
and it generated too many false positives. For example, one of the
projects conducted in Capelle aan den Ijssel resulted in 62 violations
out of 113 issued risk reports and tens of thousands of cases
investigated.150 In the Netherlands, as in many other places, if people
are marked in a governmental database as fraudsters, they will suffer
severe consequences that are not easy to reverse even if the
determination was the result of a mistake or computer error. People
could lose their mortgages, social benefits could be blocked, and the
information will be shared automatically with many governmental
organizations, thus making the process of undoing the error much
longer and more complicated.151
Although SyRI did not execute automatic decisions to cut social
benefits like MiDAS, there was a significant public backlash against the
system, and the consequences of the government surveillance led
nonprofit organizations and several individuals to file a lawsuit in the
District Court of The Hague.152 The plaintiffs requested that the court
declare the use of SyRI illegal on the basis of privacy violation, unlawful
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profiling of innocent citizens, the potential discriminatory effect of the
system that was deployed mainly in poor cities, and the extent of the
data sharing between entities.153 On February 5, 2020, the District
Court of The Hague ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and declared Article
65 of SUWI illegal.154 The court viewed the purpose of fighting fraud as
legitimate and it encouraged the government to take advantage of new
technology to combat unlawful use of public money.155 This is because
social security is one of the pillars of Dutch society, since it is funded by
public money, and it is crucial to fight against fraud in order to
maintain the solidarity and trust that the Dutch people have in their
government.156 However, the court ruled that the operation’s
implementation violated basic human rights norms and that there was
a lack of sufficient safeguards for the automation.157
IV. SITUATING THE CASE STUDIES WITHIN THE SOCIOPOLITICAL
CONTEXT
Technical tools do not operate in a vacuum. They are developed
in a specific context, often to fulfill a certain agenda, and they are
shaped by the sociopolitical framework in which they operate.158 As
mentioned earlier, the degree of autonomy of street-level bureaucrats
was always in question, both under the traditional public management
approach when they were controlled and later on when they were given
more autonomy. This debate continues because street-level bureaucrats
are perceived as representatives of the higher administration and carry
out their agendas, thus exposing that their work is prone to political
influence. This Part demonstrates how the failures and problems
created by both MiDAS and SyRI cannot be attributed only to the
inevitable consequences of automation—they are also a result of
intentional policy choices. However, the question of whether welfare

153.
See Proceedings Against Risk Profiling Dutch Citizens Through SyRI, PUB. INT. LITIG.
PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2019), https://pilpnjcm.nl/en/proceedings-risk-profiling-dutch-citizens-syri/
[https://perma.cc/H86Q-C555].
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157.
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Dutch Court Rules, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2020, 8:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
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See Yochai Benkler, The Role of Technology in Political Economy: Part 2, LAW & POL.
ECON. (July 26, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/07/26/the-role-of-technology-in-political-economypart-2/ [https://perma.cc/364C-24JG].
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fraud is a domain that should be automated in the first place must be
addressed before diving into the specific claims related to the impact of
automation on street-level bureaucrats and their discretion.
Governmental reforms that are aimed at improving efficiency
and accountability often shift, limit, or expand patterns of discretion,
and those changes can hurt certain populations more than others.
Thus, automation often leads to minimizing the discretion of
street-level bureaucrats who work in welfare agencies, which in turn
disproportionately impacts the poor and the vulnerable by limiting
their rights and access to benefits.159 Virginia Eubanks, in her book
Automating Inequality, discusses several examples of how welfare
systems are designed to punish the poor and the disadvantaged and
how automation has been used for decades for tracking, surveilling,
and infringing on people’s rights.160 The Scientific Charity movement
that arose in the United States as early as the 1870s focused on
creating databases using the presumed characteristics of poverty (low
intelligence, criminality, and unrestricted sexuality).161 Race played a
major role in the analysis, and white poverty was treated differently
than Black poverty.162 Later on, the deployment of technology led to
a decrease in the number of people receiving benefits because
few could deal with the resulting bureaucratic burden.163 Thus, the
physical poorhouses of the nineteenth century were replaced with
twentieth-century digital poorhouses—systems in which computers
collected, analyzed, and stored a huge amount of data about families
receiving public benefits. Instead of rationalizing the benefit
distribution, the digital poorhouses profiled, policed, and punished the
poor.164 On the international level, many researchers have highlighted
the fact that although the right to social security has been recognized
internationally and ratified in the United States and in the
Netherlands, receivers of social benefits are treated as second-class
citizens.165 They are looked at with suspicion and are subjected to
infringement of their basic rights, including the right to privacy.166
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Thus, cracking down on welfare fraud is part of a general trend of
undermining the human right to social security and framing it instead
as a rationed property right. Another phenomenon is the use of the
media for alienating poverty and increasing racial polarization.
Although Black poverty decreased dramatically during the 1960s,
media stories about poverty continued to emphasize Black persons.
Specifically, the representation of Black faces in poverty-related stories
increased from 27 percent to 72 percent in a period of three years in the
1960s.167
The technological capabilities of tools used by governments,
coupled with the risk of stigmatizing welfare recipients, have recently
received special attention from the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme
poverty and human rights, Philip Alston. Alston warns in a report of “a
grave risk of stumbling zombie-like into a digital welfare dystopia.”168
In the “digital welfare state,” technology is used for automating,
predicting, surveilling, targeting, and punishing the poor.169 Alston
highlights this move as a dangerous slippery slope, since technology is
often presented as “an altruistic and noble enterprise designed to
ensure that citizens benefit from new technologies, experience more
efficient government, and enjoy higher levels of well-being.”170 But in
fact, automation also leads to significant reductions in the welfare
budget, imposes heavier sanctions on minor violations, narrows the
number of people who get the benefits by scaring potential applicants
away with new and complex procedures, and, most importantly for
welfare recipients, eliminates human interaction with public officers.171
As it will be explained below, the motives behind adopting both MiDAS
and SyRI are quite complex and influenced by a convenient
sociopolitical environment.
A. The Sociopolitical Context Surrounding MiDAS
In Michigan, civil rights organizations have pointed out various
attempts by the governor at the time, Republican Rick Snyder, to
minimize welfare support and deploy technology to cut costs and
prioritize financial efficiency. Before getting elected as governor,
Snyder worked in the private sector in different positions, including at

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

EUBANKS, supra note 160, at 33.
Alston, supra note 22.
See id.
Id.
Id.

480

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:3:451

Gateway, a computer company.172 In Michigan, Snyder teamed up with
state legislators to reform the budget plan and eliminate the state
deficit.173 He restructured the Department of Licensing and Regulatory
Affairs (LARA), whose mission was to reinvent government as customer
driven and business minded.174 In terms of unemployment benefits, in
2011, Snyder cut the number of weeks that Michigan citizens were
eligible for unemployment benefits from twenty-six weeks to twenty
weeks, the lowest in the nation at the time.175 In addition, the state of
Michigan charges those who wrongly obtain unemployment benefits a
penalty of 400 percent plus interest, the highest penalty rate charged
by any state.176
This policy is reflected in the way MiDAS operates. MiDAS is
designed to declare fraud regardless of whether the claimant has in fact
committed fraud. MiDAS was driven by the UIA’s desire to find fraud,
and therefore almost every investigation was flagged as fraudulent for
misconduct.177 Unsurprisingly, a major criticism of MiDAS was the
number of false accusations. In fact, 93 percent of the cases flagged by
MiDAS were incorrect.178 Hence, even if the purpose of adopting MiDAS
was justifiable, the way it was implemented was not.
In addition to the MiDAS case, another lawsuit was brought
against the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services
(MDHHS) because of a similar, draconian automation program. The
algorithm in that case automatically disqualified individuals from
receiving food assistance if they had any outstanding felony
warrants.179 The Freedom of Information Act requests conducted in
preparation for the lawsuit have revealed that MDHHS is planning to
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ARBOR NEWS (June 24, 2010, 6:10 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/business-review/did-ricksnyder-ship-jobs-overseas-at-gateway/ [https://perma.cc/55YR-EBH7].
173.
See MICH. STATE BUDGET OFF., DEPT. OF TECH., MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEARS 2018
AND 2019 EXECUTIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDATION (2017), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/FY18_Exec_Budget_550967_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/P83U-2YL9].
174.
Core Values, MICH. DEP’T OF LICENSING & REGUL. AFFS., https://www.michigan.gov/
lara/0,4601,7-154-10573-352890—,00.html [https://perma.cc/52YY-DV58] (last visited Feb. 4,
2020).
175.
MIDAS FACTSHEET, supra note 24, at 2.
176.
Id.
177.
See Ryan Felton, Michigan Unemployment Agency Made 20,000 False Fraud
Accusations – Report, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/dec/18/michigan-unemployment-agency-fraud-accusations [https://perma.cc/4LA7-BLBE].
178.
Id.
179.
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 19.

2021]

AUTOMATION’S IMPACT ON BUREAUCRACY

481

use the findings of the algorithm as part of a media campaign that
bullies poor individuals who rely on government benefits.180
B. The Sociopolitical Context Surrounding SyRI
In the Netherlands, the political backlash has been milder than
in Michigan, and criticism centers on disappointment about what has
happened to the welfare state.181 However, during the trial, the
plaintiffs claimed that SyRI is not a standalone project but rather part
of a governmental attempt to apply risk profiling in all sectors of
society.182 In fact, several legislative proposals aim to ease data sharing
between agencies.183 There has been a notable change in recent years
in the fight against fraud. Imposing sanctions on fraudsters used to be
rare; the starting point now is that citizens are guilty until proven
innocent. If there is a suspicion that fraud is being committed, benefits
are cut and will not be restored unless the claimants have the time,
resources, and ability to appeal the decision and prove that they were
entitled to the money.184 This is part of a broader issue with automation,
which increases the power gap between the individual and the
government by shifting the burden of tracking, identifying, and
detecting the source of the error to the individual.185
The main claim that received attention in the final judgment
was the fact that all the projects involving SyRI took place in
neighborhoods that are predominantly poor. Hence, SyRI might be
targeting only the poorest and most vulnerable communities. The court
ruled that the fact that SyRI has only been used in “problematic
districts” is not illegal.186 However, given the large amount of data that
is being processed, there is a risk that SyRI could unintentionally come
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up with biased links, such as that between socioeconomic status and a
likelihood of being involved in fraudulent activity.187
Philip Alston submitted an amicus brief in support of the
plaintiffs in the SyRI case that shed some light on the possible impact
of SyRI on the poor and shows how this was a systematic approach that
had been taking place in different forms for many years.188 Alston
explained how the practice of targeting the poor started in the early
2000s.189 Typically, the people targeted by SyRI are those less likely to
be able to defend themselves against intrusions of their privacy.
Various authorities, including the welfare ministries, tax authorities,
police, and prosecutors started to collaborate on data sharing to detect
fraud and illegal activities.190 In addition to mainly targeting poor and
vulnerable communities, the government often settled for an algorithm
with significantly high error rates. For example, a project called
“Weatherproof” investigated sixty-three thousand individuals who
received benefits intended for people who have no other form of income
or assets.191 The fear was that people were reporting that they lived
alone to receive higher benefits when they in fact were living with a
companion.192 The goal of the data sharing was to examine water
usage.193 If it was found to be too low at a certain address, that was
considered an indication that the individual was committing fraud by
living at another address with someone else while listing an unoccupied
home.194 The algorithm investigated sixty-three thousand individuals
and flagged four hundred cases for further investigation, but by the end
of the process, only forty-two individuals committed fraud (0.07 percent
of cases).195 In another project, while 119,000 welfare beneficiaries were
examined, fraud was established in only 117 cases (0.1 percent of the
cases), and benefits were ultimately terminated in only ten cases.196 As
for SyRI, one project flagged forty-one cases as fraudulent, but the
contribution was minimal since the relevant ministry was already
aware of those cases from their ongoing, unassisted investigations.197
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One interesting comparison that Alston makes in his amicus
brief is between governmental attempts to crack down on fraudulent
crimes committed by the poorest class and fraud crimes committed by
upper-middle class citizens.198 A pilot project conducted by the tax
authority attempted to examine whether individuals who were driving
company cars were also using them for private purposes without paying
the relevant tax.199 The project failed because the tax authority
concluded that relying on the algorithm that assessed street camera
footage would be considered a clear violation of the privacy of people
who drive company cars.200 Hence, the value of the privacy right
changes based on the class of the individual who is being investigated.
In addition, the Dutch government is known for the big subsidies that
it provides to international corporations.201 Thus, the government is
more willing to turn a blind eye to potentially big fraudulent activities
while it spends significant resources on expensive systems like SyRI for
minimal returns.
In summary, the sociopolitical context significantly impacts the
types of algorithms that are adopted, how they work, and who they
target. The attempts to magnify the scale of welfare fraud in order to
gather more support for automation and further polarize society is
especially troubling. These issues must be taken into account before
deciding to automate a certain domain. It is evident that the money
spent on poorly designed algorithms such as MiDAS and SyRI would be
better used on improving welfare services and easing the application
process either algorithmically or otherwise. Still, fighting welfare fraud
is a legitimate governmental goal and using cutting-edge technology to
do so is valid; this was recognized even by the SyRI court.202 Hence, the
discussion in the next Parts centers on how to fulfill this goal with
proper safeguards in place. More specifically, it will address how to fight
welfare fraud while ensuring that street-level bureaucrats can
intervene when needed.
V. AFTER THE AUTOMATION, IS THERE SUFFICIENT ROOM FOR
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS TO APPLY THEIR DISCRETION?
This Part deals with the first question related to modeling
discretion: whether there is still sufficient room for street-level
198.
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199.
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bureaucrats to apply discretion after implementing the algorithm. The
answer to this question will be divided into two Sections. The first
Section analyzes what exactly the algorithm automates, defined as how
broad the automated domain is and which parts of the decision-making
process are automated. The second Section discusses how much
discretionary power is shifted to the algorithm itself or to the engineers
developing it. After determining whether any room for discretion is left,
the following Part analyzes whether the discretion is meaningful.
A. What Exactly Does the Algorithm Automate?
1. Large-Scale Bureaucracy Versus System-Level Bureaucracy
Understanding the domain that an algorithm has automated
and how broad it is requires understanding the different ways in which
MiDAS and SyRI operate. The move from screen-level bureaucracy to
system-level bureaucracy was previously discussed, but as automation
technology advances, more links between different system-level
bureaucracies are established and large-scale bureaucracies are
created.203 There is no conclusive evidence in the literature answering
the question of which type of bureaucracy is more favorable. Both
system-level bureaucracies and large-scale bureaucracies have pros and
cons that impact their efficiency as well as the work of the street-level
bureaucrats.
On the one hand, in large scale bureaucracies, data is often
shared between systems, and without further verification, it is
combined to reach a certain decision that can cause many errors and
chain reactions. The idea is that the very large size of the large-scale
bureaucracies poses a risk from the governance perspective: they are
very hard to manage, their maintenance is very costly, and it is hard to
quickly adapt them to the rapid changes in policy.204 In fact, the size of
the automated bureaucracy is considered a significant reason for the
failure of e-government projects.205 Large-scale bureaucracies are very
organizationally complex, and they lack the flexibility of system-level
bureaucracies that could be adapted more easily to the needs of
automation.206 From the organizational perspective, large-scale
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bureaucracies implemented in big governmental organizations are
complex because decision-making is divided between many
stakeholders with different political motives and goals.207 The high level
of technical expertise needed for deploying large-scale bureaucracies
requires governments to move from “organizational capacity to
organized expertise,” and good technical knowledge has never been a
strength of governmental organizations.208 Large-scale bureaucracies
are also characterized with lack of coordination between the macro
implementation and the micro-level day-to-day work. There is a
significant focus on the technicalities of the system without paying
much attention to the interaction of the worker with the technology and
how the technology is being used to achieve the task.209
On the other hand, large-scale bureaucracies have more capacity
to lead change. They are often implemented in large organizations that
would have more financial and organizational capabilities to support
change, especially when compared with system-level bureaucracies
that are often implemented in smaller organizations.210 Large-scale
bureaucracies also have unique advantages, such as enabling
information sharing and collaboration between different entities within
the government and outside of it. These collaborations can help entities
provide better services, avoiding redundancy of information, reducing
costs, improving accountability, and tackling complex problems.211
In terms of discretion, if implemented correctly and not just for
the sole purpose of increasing efficiency, both types of bureaucracy
could potentially improve discretionary street-level bureaucracy.
System-level bureaucracy could “free” street-level bureaucrats from the
repetitive administrative tasks and dedicate more time for frontline
customer service and support. If large-scale bureaucracy is transparent
and explainable, it could help street-level bureaucrats understand why
a certain decision about an individual was taken and communicate it to
the individual. Street-level bureaucrats would have access to more data
and decisions taken by other agencies because of the links between the
207.
See Julia Klier, Mathias Klier & Sebastian Muschter, How to Manage IS
Requirements in Complex Public Sector Structures: Toward an Action Design Research Approach,
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208.
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systems, so they could also explain the situation better to their
customers.212 It should be emphasized that as mentioned, this will only
be possible if governmental agencies realize the potential of automation
to improve customer services. This would require keeping caseworkers
at their jobs, not distancing them from individuals who need their help
by putting walls of technology between the two.213
MiDAS can be defined as a system-level bureaucracy because it
automated a relatively narrow domain—fraud in unemployment
benefits. Thus, if the factors that the algorithm considered were
publicly available, it would have been possible to understand and, if
necessary, to argue whether the connections that the algorithm made
between the specific factors and unemployment fraud were right or
wrong.
In contrast, SyRI automated a broader domain—all types of
fraud in welfare benefits—which makes it a large-scale bureaucracy.
Because little is known about this type of bureaucracy, a parliamentary
inquiry was launched to investigate the deployment of IT in
governmental services. The inquiry criticized the complexity of
large-scale projects because they are composed of a chain of systems,
making it difficult to track down problems that arose from the system,
understand their sources, and solve them.214 Thus, the legislators
recommended minimizing the use of large-scale bureaucracies in the
Netherlands.215 However, this would reduce the benefits of interagency
collaboration. Despite the aforementioned failures, the municipalities
that adopted SyRI emphasized in their final reports that they benefited
immensely from the collaboration between the different entities,
including those outside of the core mission of the project, because
the participants in the project developed a network and gained
understanding of each member’s expertise, thus allowing them to better
care for their citizens.216
It is also worth mentioning that, in the past, SyRI used to
operate as an ordinary system-level bureaucracy, but the outcome was
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HANDHAVING EN NALEVING ADVIES BV, EINDRAPPORT GALOP II EINDHOVEN (2018) (Neth.).
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not necessarily better. SyRI is actually the third version of an algorithm
that has been used by the government since 2003.217 The first version
of the algorithm was Project Waterproof, in which the government
linked data about the water usage of individuals and data about
welfare benefits in order to find potential fraudulent activities by
comparing the reported number of inhabitants living in a unit versus
what was happening in practice.218 The second version of the
algorithm was called Black Box, which consisted of three types of
projects: phenomenon-driven projects (projects that attempted to crack
down on a specific phenomenon, such as residential fraud or asset
fraud); business-oriented projects (projects that attempted to crack
down on the types of sectors known to be violating labor laws,
such as the hotel industry, catering, and cleaning services); and
neighborhood-oriented projects (projects that analyzed certain
neighborhoods and attempted to provide social support, combat crime,
and detect fraud).219 After legal changes, Black Box became SyRI, which
adopted the neighborhood-oriented approach and abandoned the other
two types of projects.220 It should be mentioned that Waterproof and
Black Box both had significant flaws, so it is hard to conclude that a
system-level bureaucracy was necessarily better than a large-scale
bureaucracy. Their flaws can partially be attributed to faulty data
anonymization, legal hurdles, and poor technical design, so it is difficult
to predict whether a system-level bureaucracy would have been more
successful in the absence of these hurdles. Nevertheless, it would be
beneficial to consider the issue of scale when designing the next phase
of SyRI and assessing the costs and benefits of the two types of systems.
Some researchers recommend staying away from large-scale
bureaucracies and focusing on ad hoc system-level bureaucracies.221
System-level bureaucracies are easier to implement overall, especially
in government, and it is easier to track their performance and avoid
errors, thus they should be favored when possible, but this conclusion
cannot be absolute.222 Determining which type of system to adopt would
depend on many factors including the goal that the automation aims to
achieve, the potential added value of collaborations between agencies,
and the possible risks that might arise because of the link between
systems. The governmental entity considering such deployment should
217.
Maranke Wieringa, A Brief History of Social Security: SyRI and the State Being Sued
(dissertation, Utrecht University) (on file with author).
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
221.
Zouridis, van Eck & Bovens, supra note 59, at 313, 322–23.
222.
See supra pp. 483–485.
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assess the impact of each type of system and the feasibility of achieving
the goals of the project using a system-level bureaucracy.
2. Decision-Making Versus Decision-Aiding Algorithms
In addition to determining an algorithm’s domain,
understanding the decision-making process that it automates is key.
The difference between decision-making algorithms and decision-aiding
algorithms is the finality of the algorithm’s determination and the level
of human involvement. Decision-making algorithms automatically
issue a coercive decision based mainly on links between data without
any human input.223 The decision, which is usually final, results in a
significant impact on applicants, such as the termination of benefits.224
Decision-aiding algorithms, on the other hand, attempt to help the
relevant individual make his or her final decision.225 The underlying
software often provides recommendations based on the analyzed
data.226 The higher degree of human intervention makes this type of
algorithm less risky than decision-making algorithms.227
MiDAS and SyRI are very different in terms of their
decision-making capabilities and are in fact on opposite ends of the
spectrum. MiDAS is a full-on decision-making algorithm: it automates
all processes from beginning to end, including data collection, analysis,
fraud determination, and debt collection.228 SyRI only automates
data collection and analysis, with street-level bureaucrats from
relevant agencies completing the investigations and making final
determinations.229 Thus, it is clearly a decision-aiding algorithm. As
mentioned previously, eliminating discretion in welfare distribution is
impossible because even clear and specific rules will not be able to
capture the complexities of each individual case.230 In other words,

223.
Yeung, supra note 9, at 121.
224.
See Lydia X. Z. Brown, Michelle Richardson, Ridhi Shetty & Andrew Crawford,
Report: Challenging the Use of Algorithm-Driven Decision-Making in Benefits Determinations
Affecting People with Disabilities, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://cdt.org/insights/report-challenging-the-use-of-algorithm-driven-decision-making-in-benefits-determinations-affecting-people-with-disabilities/ [https://perma.cc/BW26-BDHS].
225.
Yeung, supra note 9, at 121.
226.
Id. at 130.
227.
See id. at 122.
228.
See Stephanie Wykstra, Government’s Use of Algorithm Serves Up False Fraud
Charges, UNDARK MAG. (June 1, 2020), https://undark.org/2020/06/01/michigan-unemploymentfraud-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/E48Z-8RAW].
229.
Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶ 6.48 (Neth.).
230.
Molander, Grimen & Eriksen, supra note 42, at 215–16.
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human discretion will always have to be part of the equation;
governments must draw the boundaries of discretion because they
cannot eradicate it.231 Therefore, any changes to MiDAS should include
giving more responsibilities to street-level bureaucrats and making
sure that it becomes a decision-aiding algorithm.
3. Automating Rules Versus Automating Standards
In governing a certain domain, legislators and policy makers
have to determine the optimal specificity of law that on the one hand
would provide certainty and precision for individuals, lawyers, and
judges, and on the other hand would leave room for flexibility to deal
with conflicts and ambiguities that could arise.232 In other words, they
should choose between legal rules and standards. Overall, rules are
more “expensive” to deploy because of the need to foresee and detail all
possible scenarios and determine their outcome, but they are easier for
individuals to follow. Standards are more suitable for areas of law that
change frequently, such as technology, because rules would need to be
adjusted often, a hard task to achieve.233 The debate between rules and
standards is known as the Hart and Dworkin debate. According to
Dworkin’s theory, “[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion,”
in the sense that when “two rules conflict, one of them cannot be a valid
rule.”234 Principles on the other hand are more flexible, they can
intersect and overlap, and when resolving a conflict the judge can take
both into account and weigh them accordingly.235 Hart perceives rules
in a broader sense, “a legal rule is a standard that has been identified
and selected as binding by some social act, be it an individual directive,
a legislative enactment, a judicial decision, an administrative ruling, or
a social custom.”236 Thus, they can all be taken into account in resolving
an argument.
Applying this debate to the realm of automation, on one end of
the spectrum, there are researchers who are strong believers in the
ability of technology to transform the law to a rule-based system in a
231.
232.

Id. at 215–17.
Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules, 3 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 147, 147–48 (2007).
233.
See id. at 147, 150–51, 154.
234.
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25, 27 (1967).
235.
Tommaso Pavone, A Critical Adjudication of the Hart-Dworkin Debate 2–3
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d653034873abb0001dd9df5/t/5d6ee0ec
43eb7f0001965547/1567547628828/Hart-Dworkin+Debate+%28Critical+Review%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VC2-5AFK].
236.
Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed 16–17
(Univ. Mich. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 77, 2007).
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Dworkinian sense; the technology would help foresee all possible
conflicts and outcomes, thus rules can be created in advance, applied
when needed, and the rules would not conflict because the outcome has
been pre-predicted.237 The algorithm will be trained using the law, other
related regulation, and the reach set of case law that accompany
them.238 On the other end of the spectrum, opponents of automation
claim that it is too difficult to foresee all the legal combinations of a
given set of rules and facts, let alone translate them into lines of code
that a computer can understand.239
In practice, both legal rules and standards are prone to multiple
interpretations, courts often have to apply broad standards such as
reasonableness and proportionality to solve a conflict between different
rules or rules and standards. The language of the text alone cannot
always determine the solution to every future case.240 Therefore, the
debate among researchers centers on the type of cases that can be
automated and cases where human input is crucial. The most common
distinction in this regard is between cases that grant the judge or policy
maker weak or strong discretion. According to Dworkin, judges and
policy makers can only use weak discretion, where it is necessary to
bridge between principles.241 According to Hart, using strong discretion
is inevitable because of natural ambiguities between rules, so no matter
how thorough the guidance provided is, questions that require deep
intervention will remain open and judges and policy makers will need
to use strong discretion to resolve them.242 In terms of automation,
strong discretion cannot be automated because by design the regulator
meant to keep the decision in the hands of the administrator.243 Cases
that limit the discretion of the administrator to a narrow set of
alternatives are weak discretion cases, and they could be considered for

237.
Anthony Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards 2–3 (Univ. Chi.
L. Sch. Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 738, 2015).
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Automated Decision-Making 5 (Sept. 11, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452030 [https://perma.cc/K27M-XVA7].
240.
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(2019).
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243.
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automation.244 Nevertheless, both Hart and Dwirkin seem to agree that
discretion is necessary to resolve situations where rules are conflicting
or where rules and standards are at stake. The argument is centered on
the degree of discretion and its origin. While according to Hart judges
use their strong discretion because social guidance is central to
determining the content of legal rules, according to Dworkin judges are
bound by the principle that their origin is political morality.245 Even if
the legitimacy to use discretion comes from social guidance or political
morality, in the process of automation it is important to acknowledge
that room for discretion to weigh in should be kept, and even in weak
discretion cases Dworkin acknowledges that seeking the ultimate
answer is a hard task for a judge, let alone for an algorithm.
As mentioned above, MiDAS automated a narrow
domain—unemployment benefit fraud—but it automated all the tasks
that were previously conducted by street-level bureaucrats.246 MiDAS
could be considered as automating rules since the law theoretically
defined the actions constituting unemployment fraud very clearly.
However, examining the regulation as well as the relevant case law
reveals a more complicated picture. According to instructions provided
by the US Department of Labor (DOL), “fraud determinations generally
‘require the state agency to make determinations of credibility and
intent.’”247 In addition, according to Michigan’s Court Rules Section
2.112(b)(1), “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity” when alleging fraud or mistake.248 The courts
interpreted this requirement to include a “heightened pleading
standard” which means that fraud “is not to be presumed lightly, but
must be clearly proved” with satisfactory and convincing evidence.249 To
meet this enhanced burden, fraud allegations typically include facts
showing the time, place, contents of the misrepresentation, and

244.
Ruth Kannai, Uri Schild & John Zeleznikow, Modeling the Evolution of Legal
Discretion. An Artificial Intelligence Approach, 20 RATIO JURIS 530, 534–35 (2007).
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246.
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Passage, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 1, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://eu.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/12/01/after-midas-false-fraud-fiasco-jobless-reform-bills-getting-speedy-passage-michigan-unemployment/908315001/ [https://perma.cc/W53P-P5TK].
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[https://perma.cc/Z9K5-24KZ].
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identification of what was obtained.250 If designed correctly, an
algorithm should be able to identify the factual basis, but particularity,
credibility, and intent are not easy terms to compute and applying
them to each case requires the involvement of street-level
bureaucrats—agents who were fired after the deployment of MiDAS.
Since details of the operation of MiDAS have not been revealed for
proprietary reasons, it is hard to understand how particularity,
credibility, and intent were translated into MiDAS.
SyRI was a decision-aiding large-scale bureaucracy. In contrast
to MiDAS, SyRI automated a relatively broad domain—fraud in all
types of welfare benefits—but a narrower set of tasks: data collection
and analysis for fraud investigations.251 Because large-scale
bureaucracies by definition combine different systems, they do not deal
exclusively with rules or standards. Thus, tying the algorithm to a
specific definition of fraud is impossible because every fraud violation
requires proving different legal elements that are not always internally
consistent. In any case, determining if a certain activity constitutes
fraud would certainly involve issues of morality and contradicting rules
and standards, so discretion is inevitable. In addition, SyRI dictated to
the street-level bureaucrats which cases to examine and which to leave
out.252 Therefore, it was important to ensure that the flagged cases were
the high-risk cases and to minimize false positives, a rate that was very
high in SyRI. In addition, human officials intervened only after SyRI
decided to place an individual under government surveillance, which
can last up to two years.253 This is far too late to remedy SyRI’s
false positives, as some evidence for wrongdoing will inevitably be found
after two years of surveillance. Instead, the new version of SyRI
must include human intervention prior to deciding whether to surveil
an individual and for how long. This ensures that SyRI only
automates the rule: whether the facts constitute potential fraud. The
standard—whether fraud was committed and whether to open an
investigation—will be left to human decision makers.
B. The Discretionary Power Delegated to the Engineers and the
Technology
Besides asking whether automation has left room for street-level
bureaucrats to apply their discretion, it is important to ask how much
250.
RONALD S. LONGHOFER, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON MICHIGAN CIVIL PROCEDURE:
MICHIGAN COURT RULES PRACTICE § 2112.3 (2013).
251.
See Vervloesem, supra note 16.
252.
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253.
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discretionary power has shifted to the engineers who built the
technology or to the technology itself. As mentioned in Section II.B, this
has become a significant issue after the wide expansion of automation
in general, and AI and machine learning in particular, although it
is hard to detect.254 Often the IT engineers and data analysts
lack sufficient knowledge and nuanced understanding of policy
considerations, which can lead to them approaching the automation
process with misguided assumptions about what tasks to automate and
how. The automation process requires interpreting complex sets of laws
and regulations that are not meant to be conclusive and deciding how
to code them. Thus, software engineers and data analysts could end up
explicitly or implicitly converting legal rules into binding algorithms.255
Even the way information is organized and displayed in the algorithm
reflects a discretionary choice, which, if not specified by the government
agency, will be dictated by the developer.256
The life cycle of an algorithm can be divided into four stages
as described below, and each one involves important discretionary
decisions.257
1. Planning
In the planning stage, the developers learn the policies that
should be embedded in the algorithm and the desired outcomes in order
to decide what is the most suitable type of algorithm. The IT manager’s
first discretionary decision might be which technique to use,
such as traditional statistical techniques versus more advanced
machine-learning and AI tools.258 One important difference is that more
traditional statistical techniques tend to explain the relationship
254.
See CHARLES E. HARRIS, JR., MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD & MICHAEL J. RABINS,
ENGINEERING ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 25 (4th ed. 2009).
255.
Peter André Busch, Conceptualizing Digital Discretion Acceptance in Public Service
Provision: A Policy Maker Perspective, 22ND PAC. ASIA CONF. ON INFO. SYS. 39, 41 (2018).
256.
Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 (2017).
257.
See discussion infra Sections V.B.1, V.B.2, V.B.3, V.B.4. Each one of the following
sources introduces a different classification for the life cycle of the algorithm, and for the purposes
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Making the Machine: The Machine Learning Lifecycle, GOOGLE CLOUD: A.I. & MACH. LEARNING
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/ai-machine-learning/making-the-machinethe-machine-learning-lifecycle [https://perma.cc/U45M-RMG7]; The Development Life Cycle,
TECHNOLOGYUK (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.technologyuk.net/computing/software-development/
software-design/software-development-life-cycle.shtml [https://perma.cc/A5KH-SKAK].
258.
See Momin M. Malik, Can Algorithms Themselves be Biased?, MEDIUM: BERKMAN
KLEIN CTR. COLLECTION (Apr. 25, 2019), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/can-algorithms-themselves-be-biased-cffecbf2302c? [https://perma.cc/TX9K-UTY8].
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between a certain variable and the final outcome in greater detail.259
On the contrary, the underlying goal of machine learning is enhanced
prediction and minimizing the model’s error rate.260 The developers
examine the accuracy rate under different types of algorithms,
anticipate the types of cases that are likely to result in erroneous
outcomes, and predict the differences to be expected when moving from
the testing to the performance phase.261
2. Data Engineering
In this stage, the developers collect the data for training the
algorithm. However, the choice of data set, which is what the algorithm
is built on, significantly impacts its performance. The process of
deciding what data to include or exclude from the data set is often
unclear and rarely documented.262 The data may contain explicit and
implicit biases and may be either under- or overinclusive. While the
developer might be in favor of including as much data as possible, this
is not necessarily desirable from a policy perspective because of
potential privacy bridges and other issues.263
3. Modeling
This is the stage where the developers put all the aggregated
knowledge that they gathered about the policy and the system into
practice and design the algorithm. The developers have to define the
logical sequence for putting all the pieces of the puzzle together. This
task often includes taking the problem that the algorithm intends to
solve and breaking it into small tasks that each segment of the
algorithm is responsible for.264 Very important discretionary decisions
are taken in this stage, such as defining what constitutes a discrepancy,
deciding what factors will be considered by the algorithm and their
259.
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260.
See Momin M. Malik, A Hierarchy of Limitations in Machine Learning 21 (Feb. 29,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.05193.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3AL638F].
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relative weight, and defining the possible outcomes. If not tuned
correctly, the algorithm learns how to maximize its decision-making
performance at all costs, even if this means excluding certain
populations.265
4. Testing and Maintenance
A machine-learning algorithm, which constantly learns and
produces outputs that determine significant aspects of people’s lives,
has to be regularly tested and maintained. Auditing should continue
both during the algorithm’s development and afterward to ensure
alignment with the policies it is meant to enforce.266
It is important to mention that the different stages in the life
cycle of the algorithm are often inseparable and operate consecutively.
Thus, planning is not over after the developer has some idea about the
policy and the needed change, and data engineering should always be
updated in light of the testing and maintenance processes.
C. Application to MiDAS and SyRI
Determining the proportion of discretionary power that is
shifted to the engineers or the technology is perhaps the hardest
challenge in these case studies. Both the UIA in Michigan and the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in the Netherlands fought
hard in courts not to reveal their algorithms. In Michigan, the cases are
still in the discovery phase, and thus far the plaintiffs have not been
able to obtain access to the code or to publicly reveal any significant
information about the operation of the algorithm.267 As for SyRI, the
court’s final judgement recognized the fact that the state refused to
reveal the algorithm.268 However, revealing the whole code to the public
is not the only way to learn about the development process. Many
algorithms that operate in sensitive, public-sector domains have
manuals that are easily accessible, and sometimes even technical
documents with details about error rates are available.269 Another
265.
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solution would be to strengthen the procurement rules and to require
certain guarantees, such as technical accountability and sufficient
disclosures of the vendor’s intended development process.270 The fact
that MiDAS delegated an unknown amount of discretion to the
algorithms and their engineers while providing so little information
about their inner workings proves that the issue was not given enough
attention.
1. The Development of MiDAS
a. Planning
Fast Enterprises, LLC is known to have been selected through a
competitive process, and representatives from the UIA and the
Department of Technology, Management, and Budget oversaw the
production and implementation of MiDAS.271 Why the Gentax product
was selected, what other types of algorithms were considered, what the
degree of collaboration between the government and the developers
was, and the extent of actual caseworker involvement are all unknown.
b. Data Engineering
MiDAS analyzes data coming from the claimants, employers,
and other participating agencies, such as the Department of Health and
Human Services.272 Information is lacking about the types of data that
are analyzed and what other agencies are participating. In addition, it
is not clear how the data was tested, what the results of the testing
were, and whether the data was modified at all before testing.
c. Modeling
UIA identified 1,558 functional requirements and 6,979
business rules to be incorporated in the system.273 In addition, a guide
provided by the UIA has revealed that “MiDAS has the ability to look
at fact-finding responses and come up with legally appropriate

assessment tools used in the criminal justice system and showing that many tools come with a
detailed manual).
270.
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decisions automatically.”274 Although revealing all the rules might be
unnecessary and even open the door to exploitation, crucial information
about the factors that the algorithm takes into account and how it
operates is nevertheless missing. Before MiDAS, four hundred
employees were conducting interviews and making determinations;275
it is unknown how the algorithm replicates this process, assuming it
even tried to do so, who was responsible for coding its logic, and what
error rate the developers found acceptable.
d. Testing and Maintenance
Despite being forced to fix all the errors caused by MiDAS,
Michigan renewed the contract with MiDAS’s developers and several
laws were passed in 2015 and 2017 in order to avoid similar errors in
the future.276 However, the laws mainly addressed procedural fixes that
were not directly related to the technology itself, such as making sure
that the notice was sent to the correct address.277 It is not clear whether
MiDAS’s error rates are still monitored and when, if ever, it will be
validated again.
2. The Development of SyRI
Because SyRI was developed internally by the government, the
risk that private interests interfered with its development is less
substantial, so there are fewer potential pitfalls to address. However,
information about many aspects related to the development of the
algorithm is lacking, which is especially troubling since there are no
third-party interests in confidentiality like in the case of MiDAS. The
IB, the special entity created to coordinate the SyRI project and the
collaboration between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
and the municipalities, is responsible for the operation of SyRI.278 Yet,
274.
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it is not clear to what extent the IB was involved in the technical
development of SyRI and what ability it had to impact the design.
a. Planning
The court judgment starts by discussing the machine-learning
technique used and whether SyRI is based on deep-learning or
self-learning methods.279 The plaintiffs argued that SyRI was based on
a deep-learning or self-learning technique because the algorithm freely
investigated discrepancies on a large scale with no human guidance and
without identifying what the discrepancy meant, and the public officers
receiving the analysis could not tell why SyRI concluded that there was
a discrepancy.280 The state argued that SyRI only compared data within
designated governmental agencies for each project that was planned,
and the comparison itself was a simple decision tree.281 Thus, SyRI was
not a self-learning or deep-learning algorithm because it was only
programmed to find factual discrepancies.282 The court concluded that
some projects involved large-scale data collection, so given what was
known about SyRI’s operation and the fact that SyRI’s implementing
legislation allowed it to adapt based on its internal learning, it was
possible that predictive analysis and deep learning were involved.283
However, it is not clear if this ruling implies that deep learning is
problematic by default. If appropriately designed, deep learning can
help the human in the loop identify patterns and reveal issues that were
under explored before.284
b. Data Engineering
As mentioned before, SyRI processes seventeen types of data and
some are relevant for identifying welfare fraud, such as employment
and accommodation.285 However, the court and other governmental
entities criticized the fact that not all of the data types were relevant,
particularly health records and police data which are considered a
special category of data according to the GDPR and require special

279.
See Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶ 6.46 (Neth.).
280.
See id. ¶¶ 6.45–46.
281.
Id. ¶ 6.47.
282.
Id. ¶¶ 6.46–6.52.
283.
Id. ¶ 6.51
284.
Id. ¶ 3.3.
285.
Id. ¶ 6.50.
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protection.286 It is not clear what their contribution is to welfare fraud
detection.
c. Modeling
During the hearing, the Ministry was criticized for not revealing
much information about the system, which was especially suspicious
since even the intelligence services in the Netherlands are required to
reveal more details about the technology that they are using.287
However, the court was not clear about what information should have
been revealed, in other words, if the Ministry needed to expose the
whole code or publish a detailed manual.
d. Testing and Maintenance
The Ministry did not demonstrate any attempts to deal with the
false positives identified by SyRI.288 However, the fact that SyRI was
not delivering accurate predictions was one of the reasons the Ministry
decided to develop a second version of SyRI instead of appealing the
court’s decision.289
As the cases of MiDAS and SyRI demonstrate, it is hard to
determine how much discretion is shifted to the engineers and the
technology itself with so little information about the design and
operation of these algorithms. One thing is clear, however: the power of
the software engineers and data analysts has increased since
system-level bureaucracies were introduced and human discretion has
been reduced. As more caseworkers are replaced with engineers, the
focus shifts to technological improvements to the algorithm,
implementing new links between different components, and
incorporating new patterns identified by the system.290

286.
See Bij Voorbaat Verdacht, Aboutaleb over SyRI: “Een moloch van een bureaucratisch
ding,”
YOUTUBE
(July
5,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47HyBjSQK78
[https://perma.cc/Q8VJ-4HN7].
287.
Telephone Interview with Professor Marlies Van Arc (June 5, 2020).
288.
Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶ 6.57 (Neth).
289.
See Letter from Tamara Van Ark, State Sec’y for Soc. Affs. & Emp., Dutch Ministry of
Soc. Affs. & Emp., to President, House of Representatives of the Neth. (Apr. 23, 2020).
290.
Zouridis, van Eck & Bovens, supra note 59, at 323–24.
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VI. AFTER THE AUTOMATION, IS THE DISCRETION LEFT IN THE HANDS
OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS MEANINGFUL?
The discretion given to street-level bureaucrats has clearly been
reduced by automation, but it has not vanished completely. This is
easier to see in SyRI’s case, but even in MiDAS’s case, where the
reduction was more severe, the public backlash led to a legislative
amendment requiring UIA officials to review cases before a fraud
determination.291 Thus, having sufficient room for discretion is an
important aspect but not the only one. The discretion of street-level
bureaucrats should also be meaningful; this is in order to bridge
between the general requirements of the law and the facts of individual
cases and close narrow gaps in the law. This Part will examine what
would make discretion meaningful in two components: (1) the impact of
street-level bureaucrats on individual welfare decisions and (2) the
impact of street-level bureaucrats on external policy considerations,
such as privacy, transparency, and accountability.
A. The Human-Algorithm Interaction: Impact on Individual Welfare
Decisions
Street-level bureaucrats cannot be forced to rubber-stamp the
algorithm’s decisions. Rather, they should be given the necessary tools
and knowledge for assessing the algorithmic output and challenging it
if needed. There are four aspects related to the algorithmic design and
the structure of the bureaucratic system that should be taken into
account in determining whether discretion is meaningful.
First is the finality of the decision, what is the algorithmic
outcome and how are street-level bureaucrats expected to act upon it.
Part V argued that if the algorithm is a decision-making algorithm,
there will be no room for street-level bureaucrats to apply their
discretion. However, even if the algorithm is a decision-aiding
algorithm, the decisiveness of the outcome will determine how
meaningful the discretion is. If the outcome of the algorithm is just a
binary “fraudulent” or “nonfraudulent,” the street-level bureaucrats
have little meaningful discretion. Thus, it is more likely that they will
blindly follow the recommendation of the algorithm.292 Alternatively,
the algorithm can be instructed to rank each applicant on a risk scale,
such as from most to least likely to be eligible for benefits, along with a

291.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.62(f) (2020).
292.
Cf. Peter André Busch & Helle Zinner Henriksen, Digital Discretion: A Systematic
Literature Review of ICT and Street-Level Discretion, 23 INFO. POLITY 3, 10 (2018).

2021]

AUTOMATION’S IMPACT ON BUREAUCRACY

501

confidence scale, such as from most to least certain regarding
eligibility.293 The scale of five eligibility levels could ensure meaningful
human intervention, and ineligibility will not be the default outcome.294
The street-level bureaucrats would be able to use their discretionary
power and distinguish between nuances that characterize each
category.295
The next consideration is how each street-level bureaucrat’s
caseload has been affected along with how much time they are given to
review cases post-automation. Although cases differ in their complexity,
thus making it hard to predict how much time will be needed for any
given case, many metrics are available for tracking the performance of
street-level bureaucrats, and, in fact, this was one of the goals in moving
from the traditional to the new public management approach.296 Thus,
comparing the number of cases handled before and after automation
could give a hint as to how discretion is applied and if it is meaningful.
It is highly likely that the number of cases that each street-level
bureaucrat will deal with will increase after the automation because of
time saved on data collection and analysis. But if the increase is so great
that the street-level bureaucrats do not have enough time to closely
examine each case, the discretion will not be meaningful.
The third aspect is the readiness of the institution for the
automation. Ensuring that the public, the officers, and the institution
benefit from the automation is an expensive process that entails
planning, training, supervision, and rearranging roles within the
organization. Without taking care of those tasks, it would be hard to
ensure that the discretion remaining in the hands of the street-level
bureaucrats is meaningful.
The fourth element, the involvement of the street-level
bureaucrats in the automation process, is critical. The more involved
street-level bureaucrats are, the better the implementation will be.
Street-level bureaucrats know the relevant administrative processes
better than anyone else and will be able to indicate which parts of the
process will most likely benefit from automation. This is particularly

293.
See A.R. Lange & Natasha Duarte, Understanding Bias in Algorithmic Design,
MEDIUM (Sept. 6, 2017), https://medium.com/impact-engineered/understanding-bias-in-algorithmic-design-db9847103b6e [https://perma.cc/J3RF-5ZJG].
294.
Cf. John Villasenor, Artificial Intelligence and Bias: Four Key Challenges, BROOKINGS
INST. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/01/03/artificial-intelligenceand-bias-four-key-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/6DG7-F9MH] (explaining that imposing
additional constraints and parameters on these algorithms could help mitigate inequities in their
outcomes).
295.
See id.
296.
See Smith, supra note 33, at 439.
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important when trying to automate welfare-related tasks where the
one-on-one interaction with the claimants has a unique added value.297
Without input from street-level bureaucrats, developers would lack
contextual knowledge that is important to the smooth operation of the
algorithm. In addition, when street-level bureaucrats are not involved
in the process, they are often reluctant to accept the technology because
they see it as a threat to their profession.298
1. MiDAS
Michigan Code of Legislation Section 421.32a(1) states, in
relevant part, that “the unemployment agency shall in its discretion
issue a redetermination affirming, modifying, or reversing the prior
determination and stating the reasons for the redetermination.”299
After the MiDAS scandal broke and news of several innocent job seekers
who were falsely flagged by MiDAS permeated the media, there was
strong pressure on the legislature to end its reliance on MiDAS as the
only determining mechanism.300 The efforts yielded fruit, and as of now,
the UIA:
shall not make a determination that a claimant made an intentional false statement,
misrepresentation, or concealment of material information that is subject to
sanctions under this section based solely on a computer-identified discrepancy in
information supplied by the claimant or employer. An unemployment agency
employee or agent must examine the facts and independently determine that the
claimant or the employer is responsible for a willful or intentional violation before
the agency makes a determination under this section.301

The requirement to keep fraud determination in the hands of
human agents goes beyond the Michigan legislature. A directive issued
by the DOL to all unemployment agencies asserts that states are
required by federal law to independently verify computer-identified
fraud cases.302 In addition, the directive repeats and strengthens
the requirements of the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection
Act to “independently verify information received from a computer
cross-match with a Federal database or other automatic processes or
297.
See Hardy, supra note 84, at 46.
298.
Busch & Henriksen, supra note 292, at 13–14.
299.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.32a(1) (2020).
300.
See, e.g., Sarah Cwiek, Rep. Levin: State Must Fix “Lawless” Unemployment System,
MICH. RADIO (May 6, 2016), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/rep-levin-state-must-fix-lawlessunemployment-system [https://perma.cc/E6TD-QGMM].
301.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.62(f) (2020).
302.
Letter from Portia Wu, Assistant Sec’y, Emp. & Training Admin. Advisory Sys., U.S.
Dep’t of Lab., to State Workforce Agencies 5 (Oct. 1, 2015), https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_01-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXH5-Q88D].
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matches before suspending, terminating, reducing, or making a final
denial of unemployment compensation.”303
Although not federal law, the DOL’s guidelines and local
Michigan laws highlight the importance of keeping the final
determination of fraud in the hands of a human agent, it is not clear if
MiDAS is satisfying that. The room for intervention that is left for
street-level bureaucrats remains less meaningful since MiDAS still just
outputs a yes or no answer. It is not clear how many street-level
bureaucrats are reviewing how many cases and what exactly the review
entails, nor is it clear whether street-level bureaucrats were involved in
the automation process. UIA mostly adopted minor changes after the
fiasco, including the following: focusing on improving customer services,
working with community groups, and clarifying the letters sent to
claimants.304 UIA completed a review of all false allegations MiDAS
made between 2013 and 2015 and made efforts to improve the process
of identification and verification of information.305 On the
organizational front, the UIA established an investigations division
that would improve policy, monitor performance, and enhance
technological support.306 Although those changes are beneficial, more
has to be done to ensure meaningful discretion and guarantee that
wages will not be garnished and tax returns will not be seized for minor
input errors.
2. SyRI
In the Netherlands, as in all EU countries, the prohibition on
relying solely on automated decision-making is anchored in Article 22
of the GDPR, which states the following: “The data subject shall have
the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”307 Thus, three
questions have to be examined: whether SyRI is profiling individuals;
whether the decision will have or potentially have a “legal effect” on the
303.
Id. at 2; 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p).
304.
Michigan’s Unemployment Agency Completes Review of Fraud Determination Cases;
Comprehensive Changes Underway to Improve Customer Service and Operations, MICHIGAN.GOV,
https://www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-192-47796-428651—,00.html
[https://perma.cc/7X8TJRTA] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
305.
Id.
306.
Id.
307.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 [hereinafter GDPR].
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individual; and whether the decision is truly “solely automated,” which
is to say whether the human intervention is meaningful. It was
undisputed between the parties that the links that SyRI created
between files constituted profiling as it is defined by Article 4 of the
GDPR.308 However, the latter two questions required more analysis.
In terms of legal effects, the District Court of The Hague
concluded that the deployment of SyRI did not have a legal consequence
on the individual, yet it did have a significant effect on the private life
of the person to whom the report related because it could be stored
for up to two years and could be passed on to other agencies such as
the police and used along with other evidence as the bases for
enforcement.309
The court then discussed whether the human intervention as
outlined in SyRI is meaningful or whether the decision that SyRI
generates is “solely automated” as defined by the GDPR.310 The state
claimed that the decision-making was not solely automated because
there were two human safeguards in the process: the agents in the IB
who checked for false positives, and the agents at the relevant agency
who would make an independent assessment of whether a risk report
raised serious claims worth further investigation.311 The plaintiffs
claimed that the former was not a sufficient human intervention
because removing false positives, practically speaking, only means
removing incorrect evidence.312 As for the latter, the intervention by the
relevant agents could not be considered meaningful since the agent had
no way of understanding exactly how the risk report was generated and
what combination of information led to the final determination.313 In
addition, the individual who was the subject of the report could not
provide additional information or object to anything written in it before
the decision is taken.314
Ultimately, the court did not determine whether the human
intervention was meaningful as classified by Article 22.315 However,
considering the factors discussed earlier, street-level bureaucrats
308.
Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶ 6.56 (Neth). Profiling is defined in Article 4.4 of
the GDPR as “any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person,” so it is clear that SyRI
includes profiling. Id. ¶ 6.35.
309.
Id. ¶ 6.59.
310.
Id. ¶ 6.60
311.
Id. ¶¶ 6.58, 6.94.
312.
Id. ¶ 6.57
313.
See id. ¶¶ 6.57, 6.94.
314.
Id. ¶ 5.1(h).
315.
Id. ¶ 6.60.
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working with SyRI had significant room to apply their discretion, and
it may well have been meaningful. First, SyRI only automated data
collection and analysis, with human agents required to investigate
further before making the final determination.316 Second, a special
agency was tasked with coordinating between the Ministry and the
municipalities.317 And finally, although the impacts on caseworker
workloads are unknown, no one was laid off post-automation.318
However, as with MiDAS, SyRI’s algorithmic output is a yes-or-no
determination that leaves less room for discretion.319 Changing to the
scale system discussed above could help direct the street-level
bureaucrats in their decision-making and might also encourage them to
investigate more before applying their discretionary power.
The degree to which street-level bureaucrats were involved in
the development of SyRI is not known. However, SyRI was a national
project, its development was overseen by high-level Ministry officials,
and its deployment was very decentralized in local municipalities.320 In
the period in which SyRI was operational, collaborations between
workers from different agencies were reported at the project level but
not in the algorithmic-design stage.321
Interestingly, street-level bureaucrats were incorporated into
the development of a welfare fraud-detection algorithm deployed
elsewhere in the Netherlands. Lekstroom, Nissewaard, and several
other municipalities implemented a fraud-detection algorithm
developed by a private company named Totta Data Lab.322 The
algorithm operated similarly to SyRI but was exposed to less data.323
There is a technical document that sheds some light on the algorithm’s
operation, and the code has been revealed to three ministries: the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of the Interior,
and the Ministry of Justice and Security.324 Early empirical findings
reveal that since the development of the algorithm was more local,
316.
Id. ¶ 6.94.
317.
Id. ¶ 3.3.
318.
Telephone Interview with Anton Ekker, supra note 197.
319.
See Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶¶ 3.1–3.2 (Neth).
320.
See Wieringa, supra note 217.
321.
See Rechtbank den Haag [District Court of The Hague] 5 februari 2020, No.
C-09-550982-HA ZA 18-388 (NJCM et al./State) ¶ 6.94 (Neth).
322.
Adriaan de Jonge, ‘Rookgordijn’ Rondom Fraudesysteem Nissewaard [Nisseward’s
Fraud Detection System Remains “Opaque”] BINNENLANDS BESTUUR (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/sociaal/nieuws/rookgordijn-rondom-fraudesysteem-nissewaard.13026523.lynkx [https://perma.cc/3Z75-X9L8].
323.
Id.
324.
Id.
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street-level bureaucrats who conducted those investigations were
closely involved in the process, leading to better consideration of local
needs and incorporation of more knowledge about the local community
in which the algorithm was operating.325
Training an algorithm on data coming from the population that
it will be examining and incorporating local knowledge are important
factors in the development of any system. In addition, if local
street-level bureaucrats are more involved in the development they will
be more inclined to incorporate it into their daily work. However, a
national system has the advantage of better coordination and
accountability. Because SyRI was a national project, it had the potential
to impact all citizens of the Netherlands, which likely played a role in
why so many civil rights organizations joined forces and challenged the
algorithm in court. There is no one definitive answer as to whether a
national implementation is more favorable than a local, decentralized
system; however, the pros and cons should be considered in designing
the next phase of SyRI. Regardless, it would still be beneficial for
the national government to provide guidance on how to develop
fraud-detection algorithms. And even if the project is developed
nationally, it is essential to solicit input from local agencies and their
street-level bureaucrats. All this being said, SyRI clearly allowed room
for street-level bureaucrats to apply their discretion, and although some
fixes could be implemented, this discretion was generally meaningful.
B. Discretion as a Means for Enhancing Other Safeguards
Keeping street-level bureaucrats engaged and giving them the
ability to apply meaningful human intervention in individual cases is a
safeguard against the risks of full automation.326 Humans complement
the work of the algorithms, applying their creativity to correct
erroneous assumptions or decisions by the algorithm. Section VI.A
focused on one aspect of meaningfulness: how to make sure that the
human in the loop is not a rubber-stamp of the algorithm. Yet
meaningfulness has a second aspect; discretion is meaningful if it
helps support other safeguards on automation, and this is the focus of
this Section. Humans in the loop are one of eight safeguards
that algorithm-based systems should comply with:327 privacy,
325.
Telephone Interview with Maranke Wieringa, Ph.D. Candidate, Utrecht Univ.
326.
See Ravi Sawhney, Human in the Loop: Why We Will Be Needed to Complement
Artificial Intelligence, LSE BUS. REV. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2018/10/24/human-in-the-loop-why-we-will-be-needed-to-complement-artificial-intelligence/
[https://perma.cc/B4LS-MK2M].
327.
FJELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 7–9.
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accountability, safety and security, transparency and explainability,
fairness and nondiscrimination, human control of technology,
professional responsibility, and promotion of human values.328
All of these safeguards are intended to ensure that automated
systems are benefiting society as a whole and to guide the use and
design of AI.329 The implementation of these principles in specific policy
domains is not an easy task. On the one hand, they are very general
and open to several interpretations. On the other hand, they sometimes
oversimplify complex technical questions by providing rigid, concrete
guidance on how to design algorithms without accounting for the
uncertainty that those requirements create.330
1. Implications of the Case Studies
The lawsuits in both the Michigan and the Netherlands
cases did not focus on the lack of human discretion because that was
not the primary issue.331 The focus was on noncompliance with
other safeguards that are better anchored in the law and grant
wider protections.332 This Section discusses how discretion—or lack
thereof—impacts other safeguards.
a. MiDAS
In both the state and the federal class action lawsuits, the main
claim that the plaintiffs rely on is a due process violation.333 As is
illustrated in this Section, lack of meaningful human intervention
harms individuals’ right to due process because the role of the human
is to ensure that the algorithm operates as expected, to guarantee that
the particular circumstances of each case are fairly considered, and to

328.
Id. It should be mentioned that this is only one study comparing algorithmic principles
and different studies use slightly different terminology but the core agreement remains the same.
See, e.g., Anna Jobin, Marcello Ienca & Effy Vayena, The Global Landscape of AI Ethics
Guidelines, 1 NATURE MACH. INTEL. 389 390–91 (2019).
329.
See Jobin, supra note 328, at 389; FJELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 3, 60.
330.
See Antonio Davola, Emily Black, Kalervo Gulson, Geoffrey Rockwell, Evan
Selinger & Elana Zeide, Shortcut or Sleight of Hand? Why the Checklist Approach in the EU
Guidelines Does Not Work, A.I. PULSE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://aipulse.org/from-shortcut-to-sleightof-hand-why-the-checklist-approach-in-the-eu-guidelines-does-not-work/ [https://perma.cc/SD438EZW].
331.
See Cahoo v. SAS Inst. Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 772, 789 (E.D. Mich. 2018); Bauserman
v. Unemployment Ins. Agency, 931 N.W.2d 539, 540–41 (Mich. 2019); Vervloesem, supra note 16.
332.
See Cahoo, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 789; Bauserman, 931 N.W.2d at 540–41; Vervloesem,
supra note 16.
333.
Cahoo, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 789; Bauserman, 931 N.W.2d at 540–41.
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ensure that each individual is given an opportunity to respond to any
allegations.
The right to due process is anchored in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the US Constitution and in the Michigan
Constitution.334 The plaintiffs in the federal and state class action
lawsuits claim that the UIA violated their right to due process by
relying on MiDAS to detect and adjudicate suspected instances of
unemployment fraud and by determining guilt without sufficient notice
or an opportunity to be heard.335 In addition to general due process
requirements, there are specific clauses in both federal and state
law that detail the meaning of due process in the context of an
unemployment fraud investigation. The fraud determination itself
has to be done by a human, and there are mandatory procedural
requirements for UIA agents after a determination is made.336 For
example, UIA agents have to review any case of suspected fraud within
thirty days and notify the individual about the determination and the
reason behind it.337 If the agent suspects that the individual committed
fraud, the agent must verify the current address of the individual with
the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the US
Postal Service.338 In addition, there are limitations on the ways to
collect the debts once fraudulent activity is verified. The individual
must have the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her
ability to pay the debt and the impact of future deductions of benefits
on the individual’s financial stability.339 These safeguards are meant to
provide several opportunities for verifying or objecting to the action and
establish a hierarchy of personnel that will respond to applicant appeals
and take action if needed. The ongoing court cases over MiDAS
demonstrate how difficult it is to undo the damage of an erroneous fraud
determination and the subsequent need for these safeguards, and the
examples below illustrate this.
In the state case, lead plaintiff Grant Bauserman had received
unemployment benefits for approximately five months.340 After the last
installment of benefits, he received a bonus from his employer for prior
work that had been deferred until later.341 MiDAS detected the bonus
334.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
335.
Bauserman, 931 N.W.2d at 542–43; Cahoo, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 797.
336.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.32a(1) (2020).
337.
Id.
338.
Id. § 421.32a(5).
339.
42 U.S.C. § 503(g)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 6402(f)(3).
340.
Bauserman, 931 N.W.2d at 541.
341.
Bauserman v. Unemployment Ins. Agency, No. 333181, 2017 WL 3044120, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. July 18, 2017).
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as a discrepancy and seven months after Bauserman stopped receiving
unemployment benefits he received a request for clarification in his
online account on the UIA’s website.342 Since Bauserman had no reason
to check his online account after he stopped receiving money, he only
became aware of the letter two months later, at which point he
responded.343 Despite sending several letters and explanations to the
UIA, he was notified automatically by MiDAS that he had been
overpaid benefits and that he had to pay a penalty of $15,928.00.344 Four
months later, Bauserman was notified by the US Department of
Treasury and the Michigan Department of Treasury that his income tax
refund had been seized to pay the debt to UIA.345 Three months later,
the UIA notified Bauserman that the earlier fraud determination was
“null and void.”346 Similarly, plaintiffs in the federal lawsuits also
experienced false accusations without sufficient notice. Kristen Mendyk
received unemployment benefits between 2009 and 2010 and was not
notified about pending fraud accusations until 2016, which ultimately
led to her filing for bankruptcy because she was not able to return the
amount.347 Later on, it was clarified that the accusations were false.348
Similarly, Michelle Davison was notified about her alleged fraud only
when the IRS seized her federal and state refunds for 2015 and 2016.349
Due process, in this case, required giving the plaintiffs a proper
opportunity to be heard by a UIA agent or a judge with sufficient
discretion to identify the error and stop the snowball before MiDAS
could push it downhill. Had MiDAS been designed to include sufficient
human intervention, many of these mistakes could have been avoided
entirely.
b. SyRI
EU regulations enforce more safeguards regarding
automation.350 However, SyRI failed to comply with other safeguards
despite maintaining meaningful human intervenors. The court
342.
Bauserman, 931 N.W.2d at 541.
343.
See id.; Bauserman, 2017 WL 3044120, at *1.
344.
Bauserman, 931 N.W.2d at 541–42; Jonathan Oosting, Michigan False Fraud Case
Heads Back to Court, DETROIT NEWS (July 6, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/
business/2017/07/06/unemployment-insurance-agency-lawsuit/103482478/
[https://perma.cc/
2E7A-PNRA].
345.
Bauserman, 931 N.W.2d at 541.
346.
Id. at 342.
347.
Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 895 (6th Cir. 2019).
348.
Id.
349.
Id.
350.
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ultimately banned the use of SyRI because it violated Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the
right to privacy.351 Although the court recognized fighting fraud with
advanced technology as a legitimate goal, SyRI’s design did not
sufficiently address potential invasions of privacy.352 Although the
Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment decided not to appeal the
final judgment, she mentioned that the department’s focus will be on
building a new algorithmic system that addresses the concerns raised
by the court and includes better safeguards for privacy and
transparency.353 Therefore, it is particularly important to assess how
humans in the loop can support other safeguards.
Several scholars criticized the court’s decision to limit its
analysis of the case only through the lens of ECHR Article 8 and argued
that each regulatory provision should have been addressed separately
because analyzing the GDPR and ECHR require different
frameworks.354 Although both include common provisions such as
complying with purpose limitations and data minimization, the GDPR
protects privacy through many specific standards while the ECHR’s
focus is on legality, legitimate purpose, and a balance of interests.355 By
mixing the two regulations, the court left out important provisions of
the GDPR, such as the test of proprietary, storage limitation, and lawful
processing of personal data.356 Put simply, by conducting a more
thorough analysis of the GDPR, the court could have assisted the
Ministry in identifying the changes that needed to be done in the next
version of SyRI in order to comply with the GDPR.
If SyRI was analyzed through the lens of the GDPR, it would
have been subjected to the following seven principles for processing
data laid out in Article 5 of GDPR: lawfulness, fairness and
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage
limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and accountability. Although
the safeguards that are most connected to discretion are purpose
limitation, data minimization, and accountability, all seven principles
351.
Id.
352.
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353.
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354.
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are discussed below with a brief explanation of how they can be used to
improve SyRI in the next iteration. This Article focuses on the GDPR
since it is the most recent regulation specifically aimed at advanced
algorithms like SyRI. These checks and balances do not just cover
individual administrative decisions, but rather, ultimately shape the
interactions between citizens, administrators, and agencies.357
The first safeguards are lawfulness, fairness, and transparency.
The goal of the first section in Article 5 is to ensure that there is a legal
ground for the processing of data and that it is being handled in a
fair and predictable way.358 Furthermore, data must be processed
transparently, meaning that individuals have a right to know who is
using their data, for what purpose, and whether they can opt out.359
SyRI was enacted through legislation in order to avoid legal debates
over processing data.360 As for fairness and transparency, the court
concluded that SyRI was not sufficiently transparent or verifiable.361 It
is critical that subjects are informed about their rights and can act upon
them, especially because a huge amount of data is processed and it
comes from many entities. With so little publicly available information
about SyRI’s operation, welfare recipients had no one to explain their
rights to them. If caseworkers are told what data the algorithm
processes and how it operates, they will be able to better notify the data
subjects and thereby improve data transparency.
The next safeguard is purpose limitation. This was the main
principle on which the court relied in declaring SyRI to be unlawful.362
The principle states that data processing should be for the narrowest
possible purpose, with specific, explicitly defined goals to be followed
rigidly.363 Specifically, the processing has to be “necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country.”364 The court concluded that
357.
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https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protectionregulation-gdpr/principles/lawfulness-fairness-and-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/3VGN-Z4XQ]
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the SyRI legislation did not sufficiently justify the system’s necessity
in a democratic society.365 The court acknowledged the importance
of combating welfare fraud, a phenomenon that costs the state
approximately €500 million.366 Inaction could have led the Dutch people
to lose confidence in the government and compromise the integrity of
the economic system and financial institutions.367 Despite these good
intentions, however, SyRI went too far beyond just combating fraud.368
Since SyRI and other algorithms control the cases that are seen by
caseworkers, purpose limitation is a critical safeguard. As mentioned
before, one change could be to give caseworkers discretion over whether
to put an individual under surveillance and for how long. In this way,
humans will ensure that the burden of two years of surveillance will not
be imposed lightly. After all, automatically surveilling every individual
that the algorithm flags as suspicious is far from “necessary in a
democratic society.”
Another significant criticism leveled at SyRI was its failure to
minimize the amount of data it collected. Several public officials spoke
openly against the collection and analysis of health and police data.369
In addition, the court highlighted that, from the information the state
provided, the connection between the different data types collected and
the conclusion of fraud was too unclear.370 While there is a clear link
between housing data and cohabitation fraud, where people register at
different addresses when they actually reside in one, the court
struggled to find other examples.371 Limiting data collection to data
known to signify increased risk of fraud would allow agents to better
understand the links and patterns that the algorithm based its
predictions on and, if necessary, intervene and remedy discriminatory
or biased links. This limitation is also crucial because welfare
distribution is so sensitive; denial of benefits can be devastating to an
individual, thus making accuracy paramount. In the next iteration of
SyRI, the data being fed into the algorithm must be chosen carefully
to ensure that the system makes credible inferences. Likewise,
caseworkers must be able to understand what inferences SyRI will
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make when presented with certain facts so that they can correct
mistaken decisions when necessary.
Accuracy is another key consideration. As previously mentioned,
the accuracy rate of SyRI was very low. One project established only
117 cases of fraud out of 119,000 investigations, and benefits were
terminated in only 10 cases.372 The Minister of Social Affairs and
Employment later admitted that a major reason the verdict was not
appealed was that the system was not proven to be accurate.373 It goes
without saying that having an accurate and reliable system would allow
a better assessment of the algorithm and its impact on claimants.
Furthermore, with technological errors taken out of the equation, any
erroneous decisions can be more accurately traced back to the algorithm
or the responsible caseworker, thus allowing for proper adjustments to
be made.
The SyRI court did not hear arguments about storage limitation
because this issue is well addressed in the legislation regarding SyRI.
There are limitations on how long data can be kept. SyRI deletes
individual data within four weeks if no risk report was generated.374 If
a risk report was created, the SyRI legislation required that it be
“retained by the Minister for not longer than deemed necessary for the
purpose of processing risk reports and for a period of no more than two
years.”375 Although data storage limitations do not directly impact
caseworkers or their discretion, they do prevent systems like SyRI from
unnecessarily holding data on citizens that is no longer needed for
making a fraud determination, which is key for data privacy concerns.
The same goes for the ideas of integrity and confidentiality,
which were likewise not debated by the parties, because as required by
the GDPR, the IB encrypted the data processed and only decrypted
some data about high risk individuals later on.376 Again, encryption of
data does not directly impact caseworkers, but it does ensure that
individuals do not lose their private information when applying for
welfare benefits.
Finally, the issue of accountability is incredibly relevant to the
issue of discretion. Ensuring that public officials are held accountable
for their actions is critical for maintaining the public’s trust in the
system and the government as a whole. Given the long life cycle of an
372.
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algorithm, different public officials could be responsible for different
actions. However, it is difficult to hold officials accountable if they
cannot credibly understand the algorithm’s operation because they will
not be able to justify its decisions on appeal. Therefore, street-level
bureaucrats must be able to develop an adequate understanding of the
algorithm’s operation, such as what data it uses to draw its conclusions
and why a specific conclusion was reached. By providing this
information, street-level bureaucrats will be able to properly evaluate
appeals and appellants will receive more well-reasoned decisions.
Although several researchers have criticized the safeguards laid
out in the GDPR as too vague and ambiguous, it is clear that even broad
safeguards such as fairness and limitation of purpose can be used by
courts to fill in the blanks and adjudicate individual cases based on
their unique circumstances. Furthermore, it is also clear that
meaningful human agency can play an important role in promoting
these safeguards and ensuring that automated systems do not just
make correct decisions but also promote efficient decision-making and
respect the privacy rights of individual welfare applicants.
VII. CONCLUSION
As shown throughout this Article, both MiDAS and SyRI had
many failures. Some of the failures can be attributed to poor technical
design, while others can be attributed to the failure to consider the
impact on disadvantaged communities.377 Finally, many failures were
related to the lack of proper human agency. Although this Article
focuses on human agency, it is equally important to address each
category of failures in order to fully understand the necessary changes
that need to be made and assess the worthiness of future automated
systems.
In terms of human discretion, the aforementioned cases clearly
demonstrate that discretionary street-level bureaucracy is vital for the
smooth operation of a democratic society and that even with the most
advanced technological capabilities some parts of the decision-making
should be kept in the hands of humans—especially when the service at
stake is so essential.378
In a nutshell, in order to efficiently deliver public services and
guard against the abuse of public resources, street-level bureaucrats
need sufficient room to apply meaningful discretion. First, the breadth
of the automated domain must be examined: what parts of the process
377.
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2021]

AUTOMATION’S IMPACT ON BUREAUCRACY

515

are automated, whether the system is automating a rule or a standard,
and how much discretionary power is shifted to the engineers or to the
IT itself. In this regard, MiDAS and SyRI are two different algorithms
with different capabilities. MiDAS is a system-level bureaucracy,
meaning an algorithm that automates a narrow domain, only fraud in
unemployment benefits. And SyRI was a large-scale bureaucracy, an
algorithm that investigated different types of welfare fraud. MiDAS is
a decision-making algorithm, meaning that all parts of the process of
detecting, investigating, and punishing for fraud are conducted by the
algorithm. SyRI was a decision-aiding algorithm, it automated only the
data collection and analysis part, and both algorithms automated a set
of rules and standards where conflicts between them were inevitable.
In addition, in both algorithms it is evident that discretion was shifted
to the engineers and the technology, but the degree is not clear. Despite
that, it can be concluded that both algorithms left room for street-level
bureaucrats to apply discretion, although the room left by SyRI was
wider.
However, whatever discretion is left must also be meaningful.
Analysis of the interactions between the caseworkers and the algorithm
in MiDAS reveal that human discretion was not very impactful
because street-level bureaucrats did not have a clearly defined role in
the system. In SyRI, the discretion was more meaningful because
the caseworkers had the final say. Nevertheless, human agency needs
to be present throughout the process—not just in the final
determination—to prevent the algorithm from becoming the de facto
decision maker. Both systems should do more to allow the human in the
loop to consider other policy considerations, such as data privacy and
due process.
The goal of this Article was to unpack the requirement for
keeping humans in the loop and to outline the steps that policy makers
should take in order to ensure sufficient and meaningful discretion is
maintained. The role of street-level bureaucrats has been subjected to
major changes over the years, and the use of advanced technology to
constrain the capabilities of public officers suggests that we may be
switching back to the traditional, tightly controlled public management
approach. Given the failure of the traditional approach to adequately
address the needs of the public, it is critical that the recent limitation
of street-level bureaucrats be reserved.

